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THE SITUATION OF MIN ORITIES  
IN THE FEDERAL REPUB LIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.  
TOWARDS AN IMPLEMENT ATION OF THE FRAMEWO RK 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONA L 
MINORITIES. 1 
 
Matthias KÖNIG2 
Introduction 
On 11 May 2001 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)3 acceded to the Council 
of Europe's FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
MINORITIES (FRAMEWORK CONVENTION hereinafter). The new government in 
Belgrade, in power since the democratic revolution in October 2000, has thereby 
declared its political intention to improve the situation of minorities by revising its 
legislation in accordance with the normative standards of the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION. By identifying general patterns of minority treatment in both legal 
standard-setting and factual practice in the FRY over the past decade, this study 
contributes to an analysis of primary concerns to be considered in the implementation 
of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION. 
 
The first section provides historical background information for understanding the 
general patterns of minority treatment in the FRY. In particular, it examines the 
systemic factors which led to the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and 
have contributed to the deterioration of the situation of minorities in that region. The 
second section reviews the constitutional and legislative provisions pertaining to 
minorities in the FRY and analyses to what extent these are implemented in practice. 
                                                
1 Prepared by Matthias König, Institute of Sociology, Philipps-University Marburg, Germany.  
2 The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Marie-Janine Calic, François Grin, Hans 
Koschnick, Marita Lampe, Stefan Troebst, and Marc Weller and thanks them for their comments and 
suggestions in preparing this paper. 
3 Although there is still some confusion related to the proper names of some successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia – "Yugoslavia", "Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", "Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" being used to refer to the region of Serbia and Montenegro – this 
paper has adopted official terminology by calling the region in question "Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia" ("FRY"). The focus of the study is, however, on the situation of minorities in Serbia. 
 2
While addressing some of the recent developments in Kosovo,4 where the situation of 
human rights has deteriorated dramatically with the escalation of armed conflict, the 
focus in this is on the situation of minorities in the FRY and, particularly, in the 
Republic of Serbia. The third section evaluates both domestic legal provisions and 
factual practices from the perspective of the standards contained in the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION. The paper concludes with a summary of priorities for a constructive 
and critical dialogue of the Council of Europe with the FRY on the protection of 
minorities. 
 
This paper adopts an interdisciplinary perspective, combining social sciences and 
legal analysis. It is based on archival and documentary research covering up-to-date 
UN material, government sources, information provided by NGOs and secondary 
literature on the situation of minorities in the FRY. It should be noted that the paper 
was originally written before the democratic revolution in Serbia, its aim being to 
assess the FRY's credibility as a potential signatory state to the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION. It was commissioned in 1999 by the European Centre for Minority 
Issues (ECMI) with the support of the Council of Europe, which also provided parts 
of the material on which the analyses presented here are based. As a consequence, this 
paper predominantly addresses the situation of minorities in the FRY prior to the 
democratic revolution in October 2000. Obviously, this situation has changed with the 
removal of the authoritarian regime, the end of international isolation and, not least, 
with the FRY’s accession to the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION. In this paper, these 
developments could only be taken into account in a very general manner. However, 
since main patterns of the de jure and de facto situation of minorities seem to continue 
in the FRY, the information provided in this paper may be useful in determining 
critical elements for the implementation of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, in 
particular for the drafting of new legislation on minority rights. 
                                                
4 The name of the administrative unit in the southern part of the Republic of Serbia is subject to 
controversies as well. In Albanian it has been called "Kosova" or "Kosova dhe Rrafshi i Dukagjinit", 
while in Serbian language the terms "Kosovo" or, before 1968 and since 1989/90, "Kosovo-Metohija" 
(abbreviated "Kosmet") have been in use. Throughout the following paper, the term "Kosovo" refers to 
the administrative unit in question. 
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Section I: Minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Both the legal position of minorities in the FRY and patterns of their factual treatment 
need to be understood in the light of the successive dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia and its highly complex constitutional system. Although the scope of this 
study does not allow for explaining in full detail all systemic factors which led to the 
violent breakdown of the former Yugoslavia after 1989 and, in particular, to the wars 
over Bosnia and Kosovo, this section analyses those which have affected te situation 
of minorities in the region (A.). It furthermore provides a typology that serves to 
identify patterns of the state's treatment of minorities as well as patterns of social 
conflicts involving minorities, which are typical for the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia, especially for the FRY (B.). To avoid one-si ed interpretations of the 
Yugoslav conflict, only those factors will be considered on which there is a certain 
consensus in the scholarly literature.5 
A. Historical Background 
There is a prevailing tendency in Western public opinion to regard the Yugoslav 
conflict as caused by historically rooted ethnic and religious hatred. Thus, it has been 
claimed that the Balkans with its intermingling of ethnic affiliations as well as of 
Islamic, Orthodox and Catholic traditions were a “cultural fault line” with an inherent 
potential for conflict.6 That the Yugoslav project of constituting a multi-ethnic and 
multi-confessional state eventually broke down and that it did so under circumstances 
of extreme violence was, in this view, almost unavoidable. However, this perspective 
has been rightly criticised for perpetuating a stereotypical discourse on the Balkans as 
an essentially irrational and violence-pro e region.7 It especially fails to explain why,
                                                
5 The literature on the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia is abundant. Relevant scholarly 
monographs on the subject are Ram t, Sabrina Petra 1999, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo (3rd ed.), Boulder: Westview Press; 
Woodward, Susan L. 1995, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution. See also Devetak, Silvo 1996, "The dissolution of multi-ethnic states: 
The case of Yugoslavia", pp. 159-178 in: Rupesinghe, Kamer und Valery A. Tishkov (eds) Ethnicity 
and power in the contemporary world, Tokyo: United Nations University Press and the contributions in 
Pavkoviæ, Aleksander (ed.) 1997, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Inevitable or Avoidable? 
Nationalities Papers (Special Topic Issue): 25 (3). 
6 A prominent version of this view is Huntington, Samuel P. 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations?", 
Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22-49. 
7 See Todorova, Maria N. 1997, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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after four decades of relative stability, the Yugoslav Republics entered the logic of 
nationalism precisely in the 1980s with the result of inter-ethnic violence and civil 
war in the 1990s.8 After having laid out the constitutional framework of former 
Yugoslavia (1.), the following subsection therefore analyses the economic, political 
and geo-strategic factors contributing to the emergence of new nationalism (2.) in 
order to account for the conflicts involving minorities in the former Yugoslavia (3.). 
1. Nations and nationalities within the constitutional framework of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
A major constitutional problem of the second Yugoslavia, which was founded by 
Marshall Tito in 1946 as the "Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia" and renamed 
"Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (SFRJ) in 1963, was to find a solution to 
the nationality question inherited from the Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Centuries of Ottoman and Habsburg imperial rule in Central and Southeastern Europ  
had sustained a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional social space with administrative 
structures of local government and a high number of mixed communities. Within this 
social space, the liberation movements against Habsburg and Ottoman rule in the 19th
century, which relied on the ideology of nationalism and its claim to the congruency 
between a sovereign state and a particular nation ("narod"/"Volk ), necessarily 
resulted in conflicts over state boundaries and over what had now become 
"minorities". After the eventual breakdown of the Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, a political solution to this nationality question was formulated by anchoring 
the principle of national self-determination in international law and by establishing a 
regime of international minority protection which consisted of multilateral agreements 
monitored by the League of Nations and of bilateral treaties between states 
representing "their" minorities. A unitarist solution was achieved in the "Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes", formed in 1918 as a multi-national monarchy in which 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were considered to form one people, although with a clear 
factual Serbian dominance in the state. Since 1929, King Alexander pursued an even 
stronger unitarist policy which pretended the unity of the South-Slav people, by 
renaming the country "Yugoslavia" and by reorganising its administrative structure 
                                                
8 See Woodward 1995, p. 14; Ignatieff, Michael 1993, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New 
Nationalism, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, pp. 16-19. 
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independently of any considerations of ethnic or national composition. Following 
Nazi occupation in 1941 and the founding of the Ustasa regime in Croatia, the 
nationality question rose to the fore again in a traumatising civil war between Croatian 
fascists, Serbian Chetniks and a multinational, communist-led partisan army. 
 
The solution to the nationality question achieved in Tito's post-war Yugoslavia 
consisted, firstly, in the construction of "Yugoslavhood" as a supranational identity 
and, secondly, in the establishment of a complex constitutional system guaranteeing 
equal representation and power-sharing of all national groups.9 From the beginning, 
these two elements stood in conflict with each other in the SFRJ. In the course of its 
political development, however, the second eventually gained prominence. The 
construction of a supranational identity, which was most forcefully pursued in the 
"Yugoslavism" campaign of the 1950s, relied on the idea of "brotherhood and unity of 
nations and nationalities", an idea which was still proclaimed as one of the state's core 
principles in the preamble of the 1974 constitution. Closely attached to the project of 
Titoist socialism pursued after the break with Stalinism in 1948, Yugoslavhood 
emphasised the common interests of the working class over its national cleavages and, 
therefore, officially condemned and sanctioned any form of ati nalism. Under the 
influence of Vice-President Alexander Rankoviæ, the state even pursued repressive 
policies against minorities on the grounds of alleged nationalism, most notably against 
Albanians in Kosovo. In so far as the main carrier groups of this supranational identity 
were the communist party and the federal stat  organs, the plausibility of 
Yugoslavhood as a supra-national identity was highly dependent on the functioning of 
the federal state. 
 
After the dismissal of Rankoviæ in 1966, which was accompanied by a process of 
political decentralisation, the concept of a multi-national state was successively 
institutionalised through the constitutional system of representation and power-
                                                
9 On the Titoist answer to the nationality question, see Paunoviæ, Milan 1997, "Nationalities and 
Minorities in the Yugoslav Federation and in Serbia", pp. 145-165 in: Packer, John and Kristian Myntti 
(eds) The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Europe, Åbo/Turku: Institute for Human 
Rights, esp. 154-158; Rusinow, Dennison 1994, "Minorities in Domestic Politics: Yugoslavia", pp. 71-
79 in: Heuberger, Valeria et al. (eds) Nationen, Nationalitäten, Minderheiten. Probleme des 
Nationalismus in Jugoslawien, Ungarn, Rumänien, der Tschechoslowakei, Bulgarien, Polen, der 
Ukraine, Italien und Österreich 1945-1990, Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik; Poulton, Hugh 
1993, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, London: Minority Rights Publications, pp. 5-13. 
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sharing as promulgated in several constitutional acts and, especially, in the new 
constitution of 21 February 1974. Formulated to a large extent by Vice-President 
Edvard Kardelj who drew on traditions of Leninism and Austro-Marxism, this system 
of representation and power-sharing consisted in a combination of the principle of 
territoriality (Territorialitätsprinzip) and the principle of personality 
(Personalitätsprinzip) within a federal framework.10 Thus, the 1974 constitution 
stipulated in Article 1: 
 
Article 1 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal 
state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united 
nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist 
Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are 
constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the 
power of and self-management by the working class and all working 
people; it is at the same time a socialist self-management 
democratic community of working people and citizens of nations 
and nationalities having equal rights.11 
 
The principle of territoriality was realised through the representation of "nations" 
(narod) in "their" republics. The SFRJ consisted of six republics: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, in which a 
particular "nation" constituted a clear numerical majority except for Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The republics enjoyed a high degree of internal autonomy in legislation 
and jurisdiction. Within the federal organs, the equal representation of "nations" was 
guaranteed through a complicated system of quota, the rotation of cadres and the right 
of republics to veto federal legislation. While being severely restricted until 1968, the 
autonomy of the two Socialist Autonomous Provinces (SAP) Kosovo and Vojvodina 
was later elevated to the degree that in many respects they were de facto republics 
until 1989. 
 
The principle of personality was articulated in the individual's self-declaration as 
                                                
10 The distinction between territoriality and personality principles and an argument for the latter to 
solve nationality questions was developed by K. Renner and O. Bauer within the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire; see Hanf, Theodor 1991, "Konfliktminderung durch Kulturautonomie. Karl Renners Beitrag 
zur Frage der Konfliktregelung in multi-ethnischen Staaten", pp. 61-90 in: Erich Fröschl, Maria 
Mesner, Uri Ra'anan (eds), Staat und Nation in multi-ethnischen Gesellschaften, Wien: Passagen 
Verlag. On the reception of this idea n the SFRJ, see Neæak, Dušan 1991, "Die 'jugoslawische Frage': 
historische Elemente zu ihrem Verständnis", pp. 275-292, in:  Fröschl/Mesner/Ra'anan op.cit. 
11 Documented in Trifunovska, Snezana (ed.) 1994, Yugoslavia Through Documents. From its Creation 
to its Dissolution, Dordrecht et al.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 224-233. 
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member of either a "nation" (narod) or "nationality" (narodnost). "Nations" (narodi) 
that were constitutionally recognised on the entire territory of Yugoslavia were Serbs, 
Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins (see table 1). In 1968, Muslims in 
Bosnia, i.e. descendants of Slavs who had converted to Islam, were also granted the 
status of a “nation” in compensation for the fact that they did not have their own 
national republic. It is important to note that of all "nations" significant percentages 
lived as numerical minorities outside their "home" republics, especially in the case of 
the Serbs. Recognised minorities – or "nationalities" according to official terminology 
since 1959 – were Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Roma, Italians, 
Romanians, Ruthenians and Turks. Although they outnumbered other "nations" (see 
table 1), Albanians, having an external home state, were considered as a "nationality", 
with the consequence that Kosovo was c nsistently denied legal status as a republic. 
All "nations" and "nationalities" were granted equal rights (Art. 245) and enjoyed a 
considerable cultural autonomy throughout the territory of the SFRJ, including the 
rights to use their own languages in administration, education and the media (Art. 
246-248). "Nationalities" were also considered to realise their sovereign rights in the 
self-managing and socio-political communities which lay at the basis of the economic 
system. Compared to the "nations" which were represented equally in state and SKJ 
organs, proportionally the share of "nationalities" in political power was relatively 
low.12 In addition to these two categories, the constitutional system also acknowledged 
certain rights of "Other Nationalities and Ethnic Groups" comprising small European 
minorities as well as self-d clared "Yugoslavs", people who did not consider 
themselves to belong to any national "nation" or "nationality" and who often were 
children of mixed marriages.  
                                                
12 On the numerical breakdown of the involvement of "nations" and "nationalities" in office-holding, 
party affairs and the armed forces, see Crampton, R. and B. 1997, Atlas of Eastern Europe in the 
Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, pp. 216f.
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Table 1: National Composition of the SFRJ 1961-1991 (in percent) 
 
National group 1961 1971 1981 1991 
Serbs 42.0 39.7 36.3 36.2 
Croats 12.1 22.1 19.8 19.7 
Slovenes 8.5 8.2 7.8 7.5 
Macedonians 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.8 
Montenegrins 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.3 
Muslims 5.2 8.4 8.9 10.0 
Albanians 5.0 6.4 7.7 9.3 
Yugoslavs 1.7 1.3 5.4 3.0 
Other 6.1 5.6 5.5 6.2 
Total (absolute) 18,549,291 20,522,972 22,427,585 23,528,230 
 
Source: Official censuses quoted in Woodward 1995, p. 32. 
 
One may conclude that the constitutional framework of the SFRJ, especially aft r its 
reform between 1968 and 1974, allowed for a relatively high degree of national 
autonomy. Judged against international standards, the protection of minorities in the 
SFRJ was therefore generally considered sufficient. In fact, the SFRJ notonly ratified 
most international legal instruments pertaining to the protection of minorities (see 
infra II.A.1.), it actively promoted the protection of minorities in international 
organisations, including the UN Commission for Human Rights. However, since th  
constitutional framework of national representation and power-sharing as the only 
mode of political pluralism in SFRJ, it was highly vulnerable to political crises at the 
federal level. Discontent with the federal state as it developed in the 1980s was 
therefore channelled into nationalist politics and eventually resulted in the dissolution 
of the state. 
2. New nationalism in the 1980s and the political breakdown of the former 
Yugoslavia 
The stability of the constitutional framework of the SFRJ and its economic and 
political infrastructure depended on three major interrelated conditions: economic 
growth, political consensus at the federal level and a stable geo-strategic position.13 
The economic and political infrastructure in the SFRJ was characterised by strong 
                                                
13 On the international dimension of the SFRJ's stability, see especially Woodward 1995, p. 22-29. 
 9
regional inequalities: since the 1950s economic performance in the northern republics 
was much higher than in the southern republics as indicated by larger proportions of 
the GNP and lower unemployment rates. These inequalities were reinforced afte  
decentralisation in the 1960s, in so far as the republics gained more legislative 
autonomy in pursuing their own economic policy. They reflected the internal division 
of labour correlated to the SFRJ's involvement in different markets; thus Croatia and 
Slovenia had export-based economies oriented to Western Europe, while Serbia's 
economy depended on imports from the Eastern Bloc. This internal division of labour 
and its corresponding economic cleavages were adapted to the SFRJ's geo-strategic 
role as a non-aligned country within the international political and economic 
framework of the Cold War. Only a stable international environment and general 
economic growth allowed the federal state and party organs to achieve political 
consensus between the republics over the redistribution of resources and goods and, 
hence, to maintain the constitutional framework of the SFRJ.  
 
When these three conditions were no longer given in the 1980s, the constituent 
republics of the SFRJ entered the logic of new nationalism, which resulted in the 
breakdown of the federal constitutional framework. As a result of several systemic 
factors, including not least the international debt crisis and new budgetary policies 
imposed by the IMF, the country experienced a dramatic economic decline.14 Since 
the constituent republics – given their inclusion in different market segments of the 
international system – were affected unequally by decreases of the GNP, rising 
unemployment rates and high inflation, the economic crisis highlighted the fissures 
already institutionalised in the framework of representation and power-shari g.15 The 
republics successively developed into self-enclosed proto-states and communication 
between them dropped to a minimum. These regional fissures in turn resulted he 
malfunctioning of federal political organs, most notably of the leadership of the 
“Savez Komunista Jugoslavije” (SKJ) and the Presidency which, after Tito's death in 
1980, had been re-organised in two collective organs of nine and 23 members, 
                                                
14 For instance, unemployment figures rose to over 16% in the 1980s; see Woodward 1995, p. 52. On 
economic figures, see also Statistisches Bundesamt 1990, Länderbericht Jugoslawien, Wiesbaden: 
Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 36; 95-100.
15 Thus, unemployment rates stabilised at a level of below 10% in Croatia and Slovenia, while in the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo they rose to over 50%; see Woodward 1995, p. 53. 
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respectively. As the malfunctioning of the federal political organs and the 
contradicting interests of national elites became visible, public confidence in the 
federation shrank and the supranational identity concept of "Yugoslavhood" lost its 
plausibility.16 Within a constitutional framework of the SFRJ emphasising regional 
autonomy and of a communist one-party-system preventing political pluralism, 
discontent with federal political organs was most easily mobilised through a politics 
of new nationalism. 
 
Nationalist unrest in the SAP of Kosovo in March and April 1981, in which Albanian 
students demonstrated to be granted the status of a de jure republic and which was 
violently suppressed by federal forces, set the stage for new nationalism within 
Serbia.17 In reaction to the claims to autonomy made by Albanian nationalist 
movements, a new discourse developed among Serbian intellectuals, which accused 
the federal structures of the SFRJ of under-representing Serbs in the state.18 Thus, for 
instance, the fact that the proportion of Albanians in Kosovo had, due to high fertility 
rates, increased from 67% to over 80% between 1961 and the 1980s, while that of 
Serbs had dropped from 23% to slightly more than 10%, was interpreted as a threat to 
Serbian interests within the Federation.19 This new nationalist discourse was most 
prominently articulated in the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in 1986, which expressed a common concern about Serbian history and 
collective identity among intellectuals of different political convictions in Belgrade.20 
It was this discourse which was successfully exploited by Slobodan Miloševiæ, 
President of SKJ-Serbia since 1986, when he initiated constitutional amendments in 
March 1989 severely restricting the autonomy of the SAPs Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
He similarly pushed through a new constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted by 
the Serbian Parliament on 28 September 1990, in which the territorial autonomy of 
Vojvodina and Kosovo was almost entirely abolished (see infra II.B.1.). The preamble 
of the new constitution identifies the Republic of Serbia as the "democratic state of 
                                                
16 See Godina, Vesna V. 1998, "The outbreak of nationalism on former Yugoslav Territory: a historical 
perspective on the problem of supranational identity", Nations and Nationalism 4 (3): 409-422. 
17 See Poulton 1993, pp. 61-68. 
18 On the new nationalist discourse among Serb intellectuals, see Pavkoviæ, Aleksander 1998, "From 
Yugoslavism to Serbism: the Serb national idea 1986-1996", Nations and Nationalism 4 (4): 511-528. 
19 On these numbers, see Janjiæ, Dušan, "Some Indicators of the Status of Ethnic Minorities in Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia", Beograd: Forum for Ethnic Relations, p. 12; see also Woodward 1995, p. 34. 
20 On this Memorandum, see Pavkoviæ 1998, Poulton 1993, pp. 17-19 and Ramet 1999, pp. 18-20. 
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the Serbian people"; this constitutional nationalism anchored the new nationalist 
discourse in the legal system.21 
 
Triggered by the factors outlined above and in reaction to Serbian nationalism, new 
nationalism also developed in Slovenia and Croatia where nationalist parties won the 
first multi-party elections in April 1990. Discontent with the federal institutions in 
these two republics was politically articulated by introducing new legislation 
strengthening the republican autonomy and by opting, in the federal organs, for a 
confederation with enlarged competencies for each republic. When this option was 
recognised as being unachievable due to the Serbian inter sts in preserving and 
controlling federal organs, Slovenia and Croatia – with early sympathy from the 
Austrian and German governments – u ilaterally declared their independence on 25 
June 1991. This step together with Serbia’s response of deploying Yugoslav People's 
Army (JNA) troops accelerated the break-down of the federal structure, despite US 
pressure and attempts at mediation by the EC to preserve the SFRJ. Following a 
referendum in September 1991, the "Republic Kosova" was proclaimed as an 
independent and sovereign state (see infra II.B.1.), and eventually Macedonia and 
Bosnia also declared their intention to gain independence.  
 
It can be concluded that during the transitional period of the 1980s in which far-
reaching reforms of the economic and political infrastructures would have been 
necessary owing to a changing international environment, the federal state of the 
SFRJ was too weak to maintain social order. When this power vacuum was filled by 
new nationalism and the federal structures finally broke down entirely, the situation of 
minorities in the SFRJ deteriorated to the level of open inter-ethnic violence. 
3. New nationalism and the situation of minorities in the 1990s 
The dynamics of new nationalism and the breakdown of federal structures affected the 
situation of minorities in several ways. To the degree that the constitutional 
                                                
21 "Constitutional Nationalism" has been a common element in the formation of the successor states of 
the SFRJ; see Hayden, Robert M. 1995, "Constitutional Nationalism and the Logic of the Wars in 
Yugoslavia", pp. 79-96 in: Janjiæ, Dušan und Stefano Bianchini (eds) Ethnicity in Postcommunism, 
Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences; Forum for ethnic Relations; International Network Europe and 
the Balkans. 
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framework of representation and power-sharing of "nations" within the SFRJ 
dissolved, groups that had formerly constituted numerical minorities in one of the 
republics while being majorities in another republic now found themselves legally 
unprotected and vulnerable to violent hostilities. As such, they became an integral 
factor in inter-state as well as inter-e hnic conflicts which generally followed the logic 
of a triadic relation between national minorities, nationalising states and external 
national homelands.22 Given the multi-e hnic and multi-confessional space 
characteristic of the Balkans, this logic necessarily induced involuntary population 
exchanges and "ethnic cleansing". The nationalising states also restricted the rights of 
what had formerly been "nationalities", i.e. minorities. In fact, only through pressure 
from the EC and the UN have the rights of minorities become incorporated into the 
legal framework of the new states, and their respect has been a particularly sensitive 
point of the GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA (Dayton Agreement).23 Some improvement in political cooperation on 
minority issues has also been achieved by the AGREEMENT ON THE NORMALIZATION 
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
YUGOSLAVIA (23 August 1996), which in Art. 8 guarantees the protection of the rights 
of the Serb and Croat minorities respectively. It is obvious that, given these general 
circumstances, any long-term improvement of the situation of minorities in South East 
Europe requires a regional perspective which de-emp asises claims to national self-
determination and stresses cooperation in broader economic, political and legal 
structures while granting cultural autonomy to persons belonging to minorities. 
 
The aforementioned consequences of new nationalism were particularly visible in the 
Republic of Serbia. Here, nationalism and chauvinism was embraced by the Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS), the successor party of the SKJ-Serbia led by Miloševiæ. It 
captured 194 of 250 Assembly seats in the 1990 elections and 123 seats in the 
December 1993 elections and has, until October 2000, remained in power through a 
coalition with the Yugoslav Left (JUL) and the New Democracy (ND) holding 110 
                                                
22 See Brubaker, Rogers 1996, "National minorities, nationalizing states, and external national 
homeland in the New Europe", in: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the 
New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 55-76. On Croat and Serbian nationalism, 
see Ramet 1999, pp. 151-173. 
23 It has however been a major shortcoming of the Dayton Peace Agreement not to address the Kosovo 
question (see infra II.B.1.). 
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seats since the elections in September 1997 (see Appendix, table 2).24 Some 
opposition parties such as the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), a temporary partner in the 
so-called "red-black coalition", promoted even stronger nationalist policies than the 
government; similar observations were made with regard to Vuk Draškoviæ's Serbian 
Renewal Movement (SPO), which also temporarily co-operated with the government. 
In turn, coalitions of opposition parties that demanded a return to the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and democracy, such the Alliance for Change or the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), as well as popular protest against the 
regime, were systematically repressed within the FRY. Furthermore, the state 
government established some, although not total, control over public media, most 
prominently over the Belgrade daily Politikaand about some radio and television 
channels. It also tightened control over academic life, most notably through the 
UNIVERSITY LAW of 26 May 1998, which virtually abolished the autonomy of 
universities.  
 
These conditions have started to change after the democratic revolution in the 
Republic of Serbia and the removal of Miloševiæ‘s authoritarian regime. In October 
2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, a multi-party coalition, captured 58 of 
138 assembly seats in the federal elections and, in December 2000, 176 of 150 seats in 
the republican election (see Appendix, tables 1 and 2), with Vojislav Koštunica being 
elected president of the FRY by a majority of 50,24 %. However, as the process of 
democratic consolidation is far from being achieved, nationalism has still a strong 
hold on politics in Serbia.25 Besides the long political isolation, the plausibility of 
nationalism among some segments of the population is also due to the continuing 
economic crisis, as caused by the former government's mismanagement, by UN 
sanctions adopted in 1992, and by the destruction of the country's infrastructure 
through NATO bombing in the Kosovo war in spring 1999. Since economic hardship, 
the weakness of social networks and movements that would constitute an active civil 
society, ill-functioning party politics and a lack of judiciary independence are still 
                                                
24 On this development, see Thomas, Robert 1999, Serbia under Milosevic. Politics in the 1990s, 
London: Hurst & Company. 
25 Thus, the concept of “Serbhood” as allegedly even regained importance; see Helsinki Committee 
for Human Rights in Serbia, Annual Report 2000 
(http://www.helsinki.org.yu/hcs/HCSreport2000part1.htm). 
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major structural characteristics for the FRY, any long-term improvement of the 
situation of minorities requires an integrated approach, including economic 
reconstruction, democratic consolidation and legal reform. 
B. Minorities in the FRY 
On the basis of this historical bakground, one may distinguish different types of 
minorities and discern specific patterns in their respective treatment in the FRY 
throughout the 1990s. This subsection outlines such a typology of minorities (1.) and 
concludes by presenting available data on minorities in the FRY (2.).
1. A typology of minorities in South East Europe 
The SFRJ tried to solve the nationality question by establishing a complex 
institutional framework of representation and power-sharing which eventually 
collapsed when the constituen  republics entered the logic of nationalism. To what 
extent and in which ways minorities in South East Europe have become subject to 
discriminatory practices by the state or in society depends not least on their former de 
jure status within that institutional framework. However, the patterns of conflict 
involving minorities have also been affected by their e facto position as indicated by 
demographic factors and power relations. The following typology therefore takes a 
combination of the de jure and de facto situation of minorities as a basic criterion, 
thus distinguishing five types of minorities:26 
 
(i) New national minorities: The defining characteristics of new national 
minorities are that they have become minorities by losing their status as 
constituent “nations” (narodi) of the SFRJ and that, after the collapse of the 
federal structures, they now rely on one of the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia as their external national homeland. Prime examples of this type 
are Croats in Serbia and Serbsin Croatia. New national minorities have been 
particularly affected by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, in so far as 
                                                
26 Other typologies using the ethnic criterion distinguish between minorities with "home" state 
(Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians), emerging minorities with new "home" state 
(Croatians, Macedonians, Slovenians, Muslims), ethnic minorities without home state (Yugoslavs, 
Muslims), small European minorities (Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Russians, Germans), and dispersed 
non-European minorities (Roma, Jews). 
 15
they have inevitably been involved in border conflicts between the new states. 
As a consequence of their involvement in the Yugoslav wars and the 
corresponding loss of inter-ethnic communication and trust, they have also 
suffered from post-war discrimination. 
 
(ii) Old national minorities: This type encompasses groups which constituted 
"nationalities" (narodnosti) under the constitution of the SFRJ and were as 
such characterised by their reliance on an external national homeland. 
Examples of old national minorities are Hungarians, Bulgarians, Slovaks, 
Romanians and others, who were protected under the constitution of the SFRJ 
by being guaranteed minority rights, especially in the cultural domain. The 
effect of new nationalism in Serbia has been that these rights have been 
curtailed or have failed to be sufficiently implemented by local authorities (see 
infra II.B.2.). 
 
(iii) Ethnic Minorities: This type of ethnic minorities comprises regionally 
concentrated groups which were categorised as either "nationality" or "other 
ethnic groups" without having an external "homeland". The most obvious 
instance of this category are Muslims in the Sandžak region; in distinction to 
the Muslims in Bosnia, they were only recognised as a narodnost under the 
constitution of the SFRJ. While not being represented by any other state, they 
could  theoretically enjoy proportional representation at the local level, since 
they constitute numerical majorities in some localities. As will be shown 
below, however, proportional representation is neither guaranteed in the 
constitution nor implemented in practice (see infra II.B.3.) 
 
(iv) Dispersed Minorities: Dispersed minorities are those groups which again 
were categorised as either "nationality" or "other ethnic group", could not rely 
on any external "homeland" and are not regionally concentrated anywhere. 
Roma are an example of this type, which is highly vulnerable to nationalist 
politics and expulsion from both the nationalising state and other nationalising 
minorities (see infra II.B.4.). 
 
(v) A special case is the situation in Kosovo. Although Albanians had never 
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been recognised de jure as a "nation" in the SFRJ, the SAP Kosovo had 
developed into a de facto republic between 1974 and the early 1980s (see 
supra I.A.1.). Therefore, inter-ethnic confrontation between Serbs and 
Albanians has also taken the form of a conflict over secession, including 
armed hostilities between Serbian police or military forces and the Albanian 
UÇK, accompanied by border disputes, population exchanges and "ethnic 
cleansing". With the status of Kosovo still unresolved (see infra II.B.5.), the 
Albanian minority in Serbia ‘proper’ has suffered from discrimination, while 
Serbs in Kosovo have experienced similar patterns of mistreatment after the 
Kosovo war in spring 1999. 
2. Data on minorities in the FRY 
It is difficult to obtain reliable demographic data accounting for the multi-ethnic and 
multi-confessional composition of the population of the FRY. Firstly, the reliability of 
the last official census, which was carried out under the SFRJ in 1991 and provides 
the most comprehensive demographic data on the FRY, is rather weak since the 
census was boycotted by the Albanian population in Kosovo and therefore only 
displays estimates of relevant segments of the population. Secondly, the wars in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s have caused not only a high number of 
casualties among the civilian population but also one of the largest refugee 
movements since World War II, which has changed the demographic composition of 
the entire region. According to UNHCR statistical figures from 1998, there were 
502,000 refugees, 6,000 asylum seekers, 1,900 returned refugees, 225,000 internally 
displaced and 110,000 returned internally displaced, i.e. a total of 844,900 dislocated 
persons on the territory of the FRY.27 Thirdly, the discrimination and repression of 
some minorities has resulted in considerable flows of emigration, especially of 
Croatians and Hungarians from Vojvodina and Albanians from Kosovo. For these 
reasons the 1991 census (table 2) only gives rough estimates of the current 
composition of the population of the FRY and its two constituent republics. 
 
 
 
                                                
27 See http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/98oview/tab1_1.htm. 
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Table 2: Ethnic Composition of FRY and its constituent republics (in percent) 
 
National group  FRY Serbia Montenegro 
Serbs 62.5 65.8 9.3 
Croats 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Macedonians 0.5 0.5 0.1 
Montenegrins 5.0 1.4 61.8 
Muslims 3.2 2.4 14.6 
Albanians 16.6 17.2 6.6 
Yugoslavs 3.3 3.2 4.2 
Hungarians 3.3 3.5 - 
Roma 1.3 1.4 - 
Other 3.2 3.3 2.3 
Total (absolute) 10,383,158 9,767,891 615,267 
 
Sources: Official census data 1991 as reproduced in Janjiæ op.cit. (own calculations).28 
 
Compared to these figures the number of Serbs within the FRY may be estimated to 
have increased by about 4-5 % at the time of 1998, since according to UNHCR 
statistical data there has been an influx of 200,900 refugees from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 296,000 from Croatia, 1,300 refugees from FRY Macedonia and 3,200 
refugees from Slovenia.29  
 
It is even more difficult to estimate the ethnic composition in the three regions with 
the highest concentrations of minorities within the Republic of Serbia: Vojvodina, 
Sandžak, and Kosovo. According to estimates of the Red Cross of the Province and 
UNHCR, the Vojvodina as an economically advanced region has accepted more than 
200,000 refugees, i.e. about 40% of the total refugee influx to Serbia. Among these, 
there are particularly high numbers of Serbs coming from Croatia and, later, from 
Kosovo. Compared to the situation in 1991 (see table 3), the proportions of ethnic 
groups may therefore have changed. The influx of Serbs has also negatively affected 
inter-ethnic relations in certain small localities where Hungarians constitute over 50% 
of the population (e.g. in Ada, Baèka Topola (= Novi Sad), Beèej, Èoka, Kanjiža, 
                                                
28 For summaries of the 1991 census data see also Minority Rights Group (ed.) 1997, World Directory 
of Minorities, London: Minority Rights Group International, p. 250, and the government information 
contained in the R port on the state of affairs and the exercise of national minority rights in the FRY, 
presented to the UN on 3 July 1996, UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996). 
29 See http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/98oview/tab1_2.htm. 
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Mali Iðos and Senta30) to the extent that an estimated number of 35,000 Hungarians 
emigrated to Hungary. 
 
Table 3: Ethnic Composition of the Autonomous Province (AP) of Vojvodina in 1991 
(in percent) 
 
National group Vojvodina 
Serbs 56.8 
Croats 3.7 
Muslims 0.3 
Albanians 0.1 
Yugoslavs 8.7 
Hungarians 16.9 
Slovaks  3.2 
Romanians 1.9 
Roma 1.2 
Other 5.1 
Total (absolute) 2,013,889 
 
Source: National census 1991, quoted in Samardžiæ 1997, p. 33.
 
The population of the Sandžak region, administratively divided between the Republic 
of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, totalled 352,475 according to the 1991 
census. More than 50% of these are Muslims, who are especially concentrated in 
Tutin (93%), Sjenièa (75%) and Novi Pazar (74.%), in the Serbian part, and in Rozaje 
(95%) and Plav (80%) in the Montenegrin part.31 As a consequence of the outbreak of 
the war over Bosnia, however, considerable numbers of Muslims have left the region. 
 
With respect to Kosovo, accur te numbers of ethnic composition are hardest to obtain, 
since this region has been most severely affected by refugee movements, forced 
expulsion, mass executions and civilian casualties. According to the official census 
data of 1991, which was boycotted by large parts of the Albanian community, the two 
largest groups of the population (estimated total 1,956,000) were Albanians 
(estimated 81.6%), followed by Serbs (estimated 9.9%), of whom significant numbers 
                                                
30 On detailed figures of minorities in Vojvodina, see Samardžiæ, Miroslav 1997, "Izveštaj o 
Ostvarivanju Prava Pripadnika Nacionalnih M njina u AP Vojvodini" ("Report on the realisation of 
national minority rights in Vojvodina"), Belgrade: Centre for Anti-War Action, pp. 9-12. 
31 For these figures, see Janjiæ, op.cit., p.1. 
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have left Kosovo since the beginning of NATO-bombing in March 1999. Roma 
constituted the second largest minority within this region with about 150,000 persons, 
i.e. about 7% of the inhabitants. Of these, however, some 120,000 have left Kosovo 
due to discrimination and harassment by both Serbs and Albanians, according to 
estimates of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), London.32 The 
number of Turks in Kosovo who constitute about 1% of the population is equally 
contested, since some Turks complain they were forced to register as Albanians in the
1991 census.33 
Section II: The Position of Minorities in the FRY 
This section analyses the extent to which the legal system of the FRY respects, 
protects and promotes the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Throughout the 
following discussion it should be kept in mind that while Serbia and Montenegro 
share a common constitutional system, the political climate in both constituent 
republics evolved in opposite directions until October 2000. As evinced by the 
introduction of the DM as officially acknowledged currency, the Republic of 
Montenegro, formally still part of the FRY, has adopted a strong Western political 
orientation. Even after the federal elections October 2000, in which most Montenegrin 
political parties did not participate (see Appendix, table 1), and the following 
democratisation of Serbia, the relation between the two constituent republics remained 
unresolved. Also, the legal provisions discussed below are implemented in a rather 
different fashion in both republics. Therefore, while th first subsection reviews the 
constitutional and legislative provisions pertaining to minority rights in the FRY in 
general (A.), the second examines how they are implemented in practice in the 
Republic of Serbia (B.). The analysis shows that in comparison to the SFRJ the legal 
position of minorities was generally weakened in the FRY and that the 
implementation of the relevant legal provisions is constrained by the factors outlined 
above, most notably by the lack of the rule of law and by the fragility of 
democratisation in Serbia. 
                                                
32 Quoted in Le Monde Diplomatique November 1999, p. 9. 
33 Information provided by the Turkish Democratic League (Türk Demokratik Birliði Partisi) in a letter 
to the Council of Europe, dated 10 February 1999. 
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A. Constitutional and legislative provisions pertaining to minorities in the FRY 
Despite the constitutional nationalism expressed in the preamble of the 1990 
constitution of the Republic of Serbia (see supra I.A.3), the constitutions f the FRY 
and of its two constituent republics Serbia and Montenegro contain several provisions 
pertaining to the rights of minorities, which are specified through legislative measures 
at federal and republican level. Information on these provisions has been btained by 
an extensive review of material provided, on the one hand, by the Government of the 
FRY, including periodic State Reports to the UN General Assembly, to the Economic 
and Social Council and to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), and, on the other hand, by international organisations such as the reports of 
the Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights.34 
1. International obligations 
The FRY claimed to be the legal successor to the SFRJ and to continue automa cally 
the SFRJ's membership in international organisations, including the UN and the 
OSCE. However, this claim was not generally accepted. Thus, the Arbitration 
Commission established by the EC in 1991, which interpreted the successive 
secession of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia as "dissolution" of the SFRJ, stated in 
its Avis N° 10 that the FRY was a new state which could not be regarded as legal 
successor of the SFRJ.35 At the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the CSCE Helsinki Summit 
                                                
34 For the most comprehensive State Reports provided by the Government of the FRY, see UN docs. 
A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996); CERD/C/299/Add. 17 (31 July 1997) and CERD/C/364. 
Balanced information is provided in the periodic reports submitted by the current Special Rapporteur of 
the UN Commission on Human Rights, Jiri Dienstbier, who was appointed in March 1998 as suc essor 
to Elisabeth Rehn. While Elisabeth Rehn's report on the situation of national minorities (UN doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/8 (25 October 1996)) provides comprehensive information on the general situation in the 
1990s, the reports of Jiri Dienstbier cover events of the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and 1999; see UN docs. 
A/53/322 (11 September 1998); E/CN.4/1999/42 (20 January 1999); A/54/396, S/1999/1000 (24 
October 1999); A/54/396/Add.1, S/1999/1000/Add. 1 (3 November 1999). See also Hofmann, Rainer 
1995, Minderheitenschutz in Europa. Völker- und staatsrechtliche Lage im Überblick 
(Forschungsergebnisse der Studiengruppe für Politik und Völkerrecht), Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 
1995, pp. 136-141; Marko, Joseph 1994, "Die rechtliche Stellung der Minderheiten in Serbi n", S. 286-
319 in: Frowein, Jochen Abr. et al. (eds) Das Minderheitenrecht europäischer Staaten, Teil 2, Berlin et 
al.: Springer Verlag; Marko, Joseph 1996, Der Minderheitenschutz in den jugoslawischen 
Nachfolgestaaten: Slowenien, Kroatien und Mazedonien sowie die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien mit 
Serbien und Montenegro (Minderheitenschutz im östlichen Europa, Band 5), Bonn, pp. 205-286; 
Roggemann, Herwig (ed.) 1999, Die Verfassungen Mittel- und Osteuropas. Einführung und 
Verfassungstexte mit Übersichten und Schaubildern (Quellen zur Rechtsvergleichung aus dem 
Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, Bd. 45), Berlin: Berlin Verlag A. Spitz. 
35 See Radan, Peter 1997, "The Badinter Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia", Nationalities 
Paper 25 (3): 337-357, esp. p. 348. 
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on 10 July 1992, the FRY was suspended from participation in all OSCE activities on 
the grounds of gross human rights violations and non-adhere ce to OSCE principles, 
and in 1998 it was asked to go through the normal application procedure to become a 
full-participating member state.36 On recommendations of the UN Security Council, 
the UN General Assembly similarly decided, at its 47th session, that the FRY should 
formally apply for membership in the UN and should cease to participate in the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.37 After the democratic 
revolution in Serbia, however, the FRY was re-admitt d as member state of the UN38 
(1 November 2000) and of the OSCE (10 November 2000). 
 
Leaving aside the technical questions of legal succession, it may be useful to nalyse 
the FRY’s international obligations pertaining to the protection of minorities by 
summarising those of the SFRJ. In fact, the SFRJ subscribed to most relevant 
international standards of minority protection, including the rights to equality, non-
discrimination and cultural identity (see infra III.A.1.). At the universal level, the 
SFRJ was signatory state int r alia to the following conventions: 
 
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
signed by the SFRJ on 11 December 1948 and ratified on 29 August 1950; 
- International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, signed by the SFRJ on 15 April 1966 and ratified on 2 
October 1967; 
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed by 
the SFRJ on 8 Aug 1967 and ratified on 1 June 1971; 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by the SFRJ on 8 
August 1967 and ratified on 1 June 1971; 
- International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, signed by the SFRJ on 17 December 1974 and ratified on 1 July 
1975. 
                                                
36 On the status of the FRY before the OSCE see Valery Perry 1998, "The OSCE suspension of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", Helsinki Monitor 9 (4): 44-54. 
37 Pursuant to the Security Council resolution on sanctions against the FRY, UN doc. S/ ES/757 (30 
May 1992), see esp. UN doc. S/RES/777 (19 September 1992); A/RES/47/1 (22 September 1992); 
S/RES/821 (28 August 1993); and A/RES/47/229 (5 May 1993).  
38 See UN doc. A/RES/55/12 (1 November 2000). 
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Although the status of the FRY before the UN was unresolved during the 1990s, some 
of the respective treaty monitoring mechanisms continued informal cooperation with 
the FRY. Thus, the FRY has resumed participation in the monitoring mechanism of 
the INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION by submitting periodic reports to the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) since 1996.39 In 1998, it concluded a status 
agreement with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
which is the first of its kind in the former Yugoslavia, and it has generally cooperated 
with the Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Huma Rights.40  
 
At the regional level, the SFRJ, while not a member state of the Council of Europe, 
also ratified the Council of Europe's EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC FREEDOMS (ECHR) and participated actively in the CSCE 
process ratifying most relevant documents pertaining to the protection of national 
minorities. In an attempt to overcome the FRY’s political isolation and to demonstrate 
international cooperation in the field of human rights, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the FRY ratified the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION on 3 December 1998, yet without any 
invitation to do so. Only after the democratic revolution, when the FRY was 
readmitted to the OSCE and was being granted the status of a Special Guest to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (22 January 2001), were all 
political obstacles to a ratification of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION removed. The 
FRY then acceded to that convention on 11 May 2001.  
 
International standards of human rights are incorporated into domestic law through 
Art. 10 of the federal constitution, which states that “[t]he Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia shall recognise and guarantee the rights and freedoms of man and the 
citizen recognised under international law." Furthermore, Art. 16 states that 
international treaties and generally accepted rules of international law shall be 
incorporated into the internal legal order. Thus, with respect to the international 
                                                
39 See UN doc. CERD/C/299/add.17 (31 July 997) and CERD/C/364 (26 January 1999). 
40 See UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/42 (20 January 1999), para. 82. Occasionally, however, the Special 
Rapporteurs complained about obstruction of their work by federal and Serbian police and about other 
problems with State authorities; see e.g. UN doc. A/54/396, S/1999/1000 (24 October 1999), para. 88. 
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protection of national minorities, the FRY has stated in its State Report submitted to 
the UN General Assembly and to the Economic and Social Council on 3 July 1996 
that "[by] the act of ratification, adoption or approval, all the international legal 
instruments have become an integral part of our internal legal order".41 However, until 
the democratic revolution in October 2000, this could hardly be taken to be actually 
the case and, therefore, the FRY’s signature of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION has 
raised a series of questions of how to adapt domestic legislation to international 
standards pertaining to the protection of minorities. 
2. General constitutional provisions 
General provisions pertaining to the rights of minorities are basically laid down in the  
constitutions of the FRY and its two constituent republics Serbia and Montenegro. 
They comprise tate obligations to respect and to protect the rights to equality, to non-
discrimination and to cultural identity. The Constitution of the FRY, promulgated on 
27 April 1992, clearly obliges the state to respect the individual's right to equality and 
non-discrimination. While this right is implicitly assumed in Art. 1 and Art. 8 (1.), it 
is explicitly acknowledged in Art. 20 which stipulates: 
 
Art 20 (1.) Citizens shall be equal irrespective of their nationality, 
race, sex, language, faith, political or other beliefs, education, social 
origin, property, or other personal status. (2.) Everyone shall be 
equal before the law. (...) 
 
The state is, moreover, obliged to protect its citizens' rights to equality and non-
discrimination from third-party interference. Thus, Art. 38 (2.), Art. 42 (1.) and Art. 
50 of the constitution of the FRY prohibit acts inciting or encouraging national, racial, 
religious or other inequality, hatred and intolerance and declare them as 
unconstitutional and punishable. 
 
The constitution f the FRY also obliges the state to respect the right to cultural 
identity, both in its individual and in its collective dimension. Most pertinent to the 
rights of members of national minorities is Art. 11 in combination with Art. 45 
through Art. 49:  
                                                
41 UN doc. A/51/203 (10 July 1996), p. 5. 
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Art. 11 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall recognise and 
guarantee the rights of national minorities to preserve, foster and 
express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and other peculiarities, as 
well as to use their national symbols, in accordance with 
international law. 
 
While this clause guarantees the general right to cultural identity, Art. 45 through Art. 
49 define more specific rights. Thus, Art. 45 (1.) confirms a right to one’s own culture 
by stipulating that "[f]reedom of the expression of national se timents and culture and 
the use of one's mother tongue and script shall be guaranteed", and the other four 
articles address specific issues of language use, media, education, association and 
contacts to "co-nationals" (see infra II.A.3.). It should be pointed out, however, that 
the constitution, by continuing to use the terminology of the SFRJ, does not contain a 
clear definition of "nationality" (narodnost) or of what in the terminology of 
international law would be called a minority. From Art. 45 (2.), which stipulates that 
"[n]o one shall be obliged to declare his nationality", one may infer that the concept of 
"nationality" includes a subjective dimension which, besides objective criteria, is also 
crucial for the international legal concept of a minority (see infra III.A.2.). 
 
The federal constitution is binding for legislation at the levels of both the federal state 
and the two constituent republics (Art. 115) and thereby sets minimum standards for 
the protection of minorities in the FRY. The constitutions of the two member 
republics basically affirm these provisions of the federal constitution. Thus Art. 11-54
of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted on 28 September 1990, lays 
down human and civil rights enjoyed by all citizens equally. The Constitution of the 
Republic of Montenegro, adopted on 12 October 1990, goes beyond the minimum 
standard of the federal constitution by formulating in Art. 67-76 obligations of the 
state to promote the right to equality and non-discrimination aswell as the right to 
cultural identity enjoyed by persons belonging to minorities. To monitor the 
protection of the national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of members 
of "national and ethnic groups", Art. 76 of the Montenegrin constitutio  establishes a 
separate organisational body, the Republic Council for the Protection of the Rights of 
Members of National and Ethnic Groups, which is headed by the President and whose 
composition and competencies are regulated by the Assembly. 
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3. Specific constitutional and legislative provisions 
There are a number of constitutional and legislative provisions specifying the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities, most notably linguistic rights, educational rights, 
media rights and religious rights. Compared to the legal position of minorities under 
the SFRJ's constitution, the new constitutional and legislative provisions which were 
passed in the political atmosphere of new nationalism in the 1990s in some respects 
curtailed the rights of persons belonging to minorities, primarily due to the 
abolishment of territorial autonomy in Vojvodina and Kosovo and to the restriction of 
participation of minorities in political affairs. 
(a) Territorial Autonomy 
As demonstrated by demographic data (see supra I.B.2.), the regions with the highest 
concentration of minorities in the FRY are the Sandžak, the Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
In the wake of new Serbian nationalism, the de facto status as republics enjoyed by 
the SAPs Vojvodina and Kosovo under the constitutional framework of the SFRJ was 
successively abolished through amendments to the Serbian constitution and to the 
constitutions of the two SAPs in March 1989; for instance, Amendment XLVII to the 
Serbian constitution removed the absolute veto right of the SAPs in decisions o
constitutional changes in the Republic of Serbia. These amendments, which required 
the approval of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the two SAPs, provoked political 
conflict and were adopted only after massive Serbian pressure against the political 
representatives in Vojvodina and Kosovo. When the Serbian Parliament passed the 
LAW ON THE PROCEDURE OF REPUBLICAN ORGANS UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
on 26 June 1990, 114 Albanian members of parliament reacted by declaring the 
independence of Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation and by promulgating a new 
constitution of the "Republic Kosova" on 2 July 1990. As a consequence, the 
government and parliament of the SAP Kosovo were dissolved through a Serbian law 
on 13 July 1990 and a new administration was established. The constitution of the 
"Republic Kosova" was in turn confirmed by a referendum among Albanians in 
September 1991; since then "parallel" institutions of government, administration and 
education existed on the territory of Kosovo. 
 
The new Serbian constitution adopted on 28 September 1990 grants limited territorial 
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autonomy to the two Autonomous Provinces (AP) of Vojvodina and of Kosovo-
Metohija.  Thus, Art. 109 regulates the basic budgetary, legislative, executive and 
other competencies of the APs; these competencies are to be further specified in the 
statutes of the APs which are adopted by their respective assemblies (Art. 110). 
Unlike in Kosovo, the assembly of Vojvodina adopted the STATUTE OF THE 
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF VOJVODINA on 29 June 1991. According to Art. 111, the 
organs of the APs are the assembly, the executive council and the administrative 
organs. The autonomy of the APs is, however, explicitly restricted in Art. 112, which 
stipulates that republican organs can directly intervene to impl ment legal decisions of 
the AP.  
(b) Political Participation 
To the degree that the territorial autonomy of the APs was restricted under the new 
constitutional framework of the FRY, the political implementation of the general 
provisions pertaining to the rights of persons belonging to minorities has become 
increasingly dependent on other forms of participation of minorities in political 
affairs. The constitution of the FRY guarantees the freedom of political associations 
(Art. 41) and lays down a system of political representation based on political 
pluralism. The freedom of political association is also granted in Art. 44 of the 
Serbian constitution. Minorities are therefore allowed to organise political parties and 
to participate in general elections at the republican and federal level.42 Unlike in 
Kosovo, where Albanians have boycotted all federal and republican elections, the 
political parties of minorities in Vojvodina have participated in all elections. In the 
Federal Assembly, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) was represented 
through three seats and has held one seat after the federal elections in October 2000. 
The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) and the Democratic Community of 
Hungarians in Vojvodina (DZVM) have also been reprsented in the Serbian 
Parliamentary Assembly and in the Assembly of the AP Vojvodina. Neither federal 
nor Serbian provisions, however, guarantee the proportional representation in political 
or administrative organs. In the Republic of Montenegro, on the contrary, members of 
                                                
42 It should be noted that Serbian laws regulate that political organisations may be prohibited for 
foreign financial income, i.e. that political organisations of minorities may not receive financial support 
by their external national homeland; see Marko 1996, p. 236. 
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national or ethnic groups are granted the right to proportional representation in public 
services, state organs and local administration according to Art. 73 of the constitution.  
(c) Language 
The constitution of the FRY sets forth in Art. 15 (1.) that the official language of the 
state shall be the Serbian language with Cyrillic and, where provided by the 
Constitution and law, Latin as official scripts, while Art. 15 (2) makes some 
provisions for the official use of minority languages.   
 
Art. 15 (1) In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian 
language in its ekavian and ijekavian dialects and the Cyrillic script 
shall be official, while the Latin script shall be in official use as 
provided for by the Constitution and law. 
(2) In regions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inhabited by 
national minorities, the languages and scripts of these minorities 
shall also be in official use in the manner prescribed by law. 
 
However, the possibility of official use of minority languages in regions inhabited by 
national minorities is conditional on legislative regulations. The right to the use of 
minority languages in education and in public proceedings is specified in Art. 46 (1.) 
and Art. 49. According to Art. 46 (1.), members of national minorities are granted the 
right to education in their own language, and Art. 49 guarantees the right to use one's 
own language and to be informed in one's own language in proceedings before a 
tribunal or other authority or organisation. As of 1996, there was no comprehensive 
law regulating the use of languages and scripts at the federal level.43 Th  constitution 
of the Republic of Serbia guarantees the right of members of minorities to receive 
mother-tongue education (Art. 32 (4.)), to use their language in private a d public 
(Art. 49) and in court proceedings (Art. 123). In the Republic of Montenegro, 
languages of scripts of minorities may be used as official languages in municipalities 
with a considerable share of the minority in the population (Art. 9). Similar o the 
federal constitution, the Montenegrin constitution grants the right to use one's own 
language (Art. 68) and to be informed in it in public proceeding provisions (Art. 72). 
 
New legislative measures have weakened the legal position of linguistic minorities in 
                                                
43 See government information in UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996), p. 17. 
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Serbia compared to their protection under the constitution of the SFRJ. The right to 
the public use of language and script was granted to "nations" and "nationalities" in 
Art. 171 of the 1974 constitution and was specified not only by legal acts of the 
Republic of Serbia but also by laws of the two SAPs Vojvodina and Kosovo. These 
put on equal footing the Serbo-Croatian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Romanian and 
Ruthenian languages (in Vojvodina) and the Albanian, Serbian and Turkish languages 
(in Kosovo) in administration and public proceedings at provincial and, to some 
extent, at local level. Thus, Art. 10 of the respective law of the SAP Vojvodina 
determined that the language of court proceedings was to be the one used by the party 
opening the proceedings.44 The amendments to the Serbian constitution and to the 
constitutions of the two SAPs of March 1989 restricted these far-reaching linguistic 
rights by declaring Serbo-Croatian the official language of the entire territory of the 
Republic of Serbia, including the two SAPs (Amendment XXVII). This regulation 
was incorporated as Article 8 into the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 
1990. The Serbian LAW ON THE OFFICIAL USE OF LANGUAGES AND SCRIPTS of 27 July 
1991 specifies this provision by regulating the use of minority languages at different 
administrative levels and in different domains. Thus, the law allows for the possibility 
of using the Latin script in addition to Cyrillic on signs of public organs (Art. 4), it 
reiterates the right to use one's own language in any court proceeding (Art. 6) and 
provides for the use of bilingual topographic signs in public (Art. 19 and 20). Under 
Art. 6 of the STATUTE OF THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF VOJVODINA, state agencies 
in the Vojvodina may in parallel to Serbian languages and Cyrillic script officially use 
the Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian languages and their scripts.45 
 
The status of minority languages is weakened in two respects by the Serbian LAW ON 
THE OFFICIAL USE OF LANGUAGES AND SCRIPTS: First, it is only at the local level that 
minority languages can be declared official languages by statute and used in 
administrative and court proceedings correspondingly (Art. 11). Second, Serbian is 
declared the primary official language in all proceedings with the only exception of 
proceedings in the first instance. Even in this instance a minority language can only be 
used on the condition that (i) it is one of the official languages of the local 
                                                
44 See Marko 1994, pp. 291-297 and Marko 1996, pp. 224- 6. 
45 Government information in UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996), p. 18; see Marko 1996, p. 
227. 
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administration or is demanded by persons belonging to a m ority and that (ii) no 
other party requires to undertake the proceedings in the Serbian language (Art. 12 (1) 
and Art. 15).46 Thus, although the constitutional framework of the FRY guarantees the 
individual's right to the use of minority languages i  private and public, it does 
therefore not clearly oblige the state to use minority languages. 
(d) Education 
The constitution of the FRY stipulates in Art. 46 (1) that "[m]embers of national 
minorities shall have the right to education in their own language, in conformity with 
the law". Under Art. 47, members of national minorities are also granted the right to 
establish educational organisations for which they may receive assistance from the 
state. Similarly, the right to receive mother-tongue instruction in conformity with the 
law is guaranteed by Art. 32 (4) of the constitution of the Republic of Serbia. The 
constitution of the Republic of Montenegro in Art. 68 grants the right to mother-
tongue instruction even unconditionally and, furthermore, requires that the curricula 
of public educational institutions comprise the history and culture of national and 
ethnic groups (Art. 71).  
 
The legislation which regulates public education in the Republic of Serbia contains 
several provisions which specify the use of minority languages in education at various 
levels. In combination with the curtailment of the autonomy of the two APs, Serbian 
legislation has generally weakened the position of minorities in the educational 
system. Under the constitutional framework of the SAP Kosovo, primary as well as 
secondary and tertiary education had been established in Albanian, Serbian and 
Turkish equally. In contrast, the new LAW ON ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS declares 
Serbian as the main language of instruction in primary schools (Art.4). In Art. 5 it 
stipulates that at a minimum of 15 children belonging to minorities, and, where there 
are fewer pupils on approval of the Ministry of Education, mother-t gue instruction 
or bilingual schooling be provided for these pupils. If they receive moth r-tongue 
instruction, they are obliged to learn the Serbian language; on the other hand, if they 
do not, they may be taught in their language and receive education on their cultural 
heritage. Similar provisions are contained in the LAW ON SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Art. 
                                                
46 See Marko 1996, p. 296; Marko 1996, p. 228. 
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4 and Art. 5). Finally, under the LAW ON HIGHER SCHOOLS and the LAW ON 
UNIVERSITIES (Art. 10) instruction in a minority language can be organised in tertiary 
education on the decision of the founder of the school, i.e. the Republic government, 
after consultation with the university.47 
(e) Culture and Media  
There are no constitutional and legislative provisions regulating specific issues in the 
cultural domain such as art, literature and science, except the Serbian LAW ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MUSEUM ON THE VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE which allows for the 
documentation of data on the genocide of Jews, Roma and other minorities (Art. 2). 
Yet, the right of persons belonging to minorities to organise their cultural life in 
general is guaranteed by Art. 47 of the constitution of the FRY which stipulates: 
 
Art. 47 Members of national minorities shall have the right to 
establish educational and cultural organisations or associations, in 
conformity with the law, which are financed on the principle of 
voluntary contributions, and may also receive assistance from the 
state. 
 
The basic right to free association is also laid down in Art. 44 of the Serbian 
constitution and in Art. 70 of the Montenegrin constitution. It is restricted through the 
Serbian LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS which in Art. 9 prohibits all associations and 
organisations aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order, at threatening territorial 
integrity, at disrespecting basic rights or at inciting national, ethnic and religious 
intolerance and hatred. 
 
With regard to media, the constitution of the FRY guarantees in Art. 46 (2) that 
"[m]embers of national minorities shall have the right to information media in their 
own language". While the Serbian constitution guarantees the freedom of press and 
public information and prohibits any kind of censorship without explicit reference to 
minorities (Art. 46), the Montenegrin constitution specifically acknowledges the right 
of members of "national and ethnic groups" to information in their language (Art. 68). 
The functioning of media is further regulated by the Serbian LAW ON PUBLIC 
                                                
47 Government information in UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996), p. 7-11; see also Marko 
1996, p. 229-231. 
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INFORMATION, which in Art. 11 prohibits the dissemination of information inciting 
national, ethnic or religious intolerance and hatred. The Serbian LAW ON RADIO-
TELEVISION stipulates tha RTV Serbia strengthen the national values of the Serbian 
people as well as of other peoples and nationalities (Art. 19); it also provides for 
programming in the Serbo-C oatian language and the languages of minorities by RTV 
Novi Sad for the territory of AP Vojvodina (Art. 20 (1)), and by RTV Priština for the 
territory of AP Kosovo-Metohija respectively (Art. 20 (2)). Finally, the STATUTE OF 
THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF VOJVODINA guarantees that public information be 
provided not only in the Serbo-Croatian language but also in Hungarian, Slovak, 
Romanian and Ruthenian.48 
(f) Religion 
The constitution of the FRY contains no article relating specifically to rights of 
persons belonging to minorities in the religious domain. However, the constitution 
unconditionally obliges the state in Art. 43 (1.) to respect the freedom of religion, 
comprising the freedom to publicly or privately profess one's religion as well as to 
perform religious rites. In addition, it guarantees, in Art. 43 (2.), the freedom not to 
reveal one's religious beliefs. Church and state are constitutionally separated in the 
FRY and religious organisations enjoy  non-interference from the state (Art. 18). The 
freedom of conscience and belief is also acknowledged in the constitutions of the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro; the Montenegrin constitution 
goes beyond the right to freedom of religion by stipulating that persons belonging to 
minorities may receive material support for the establishment of religious 
organisations (Art. 70). There is no federal or republican legislation regulating the 
profession and performance of religion in more detail. However, on the initiative of 
the Serbian Ministry for Religious Affairs such a law was under preparation in the 
Republic of Serbia in December 1998; although there was no information available 
regarding the precise content of this law, it was suspected that its aim is to strengthen 
ties between the State and the Serbian Orthodox Church.49 It sho ld be noted that such 
                                                
48 Government information in UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996), p. 12-15; see also Marko 
1996, p. 231f. 
49 See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Report on the Status of Human Rights in Serbia 
in 1998, Vienna: IHF. On the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbian nationalism see Ramet 
1999, pp. 112- 14. 
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trends, which clearly run against the non-establishment principle laid down in the 
constitution, have become even more visible after the democratic revolution.50 
B. The factual situation of minorities in the FRY 
This subsection reviews the factual treatment of minorities in the FRY and analyses 
its concordance with the federal and republican constitutional and legislative 
provisions outlined above. It especially focuses on Serbia, where the political climate 
in the 1990s seriously aggravated the situation of minorities. In order to ensure a 
balanced perspective on this highly controversial political issue, it contains 
information provided by the government of the FRY, by representatives of minorities 
and by third parties such as the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights and NGOs. Although it attempts to cover as many minority groups as possible, 
its primary aim is to identify general patterns of minority treatment by highlighting an 
exemplary case for each type of minority, respectively.51 All information collected in 
this subsection refers to the factual situation of minorities in the FRY before the 
democratic revolution and, therefore, does not claim to be up-to-date. However, as far 
as can be judged from recent NGO reports, it would be a euphemism to assume that 
after the removal of the authoritarian regime the treatment of minorities has changed 
immediately; quite to the contrary, some forms of racial discrimination, especially 
those against Roma and Jews, have become rather rampant.52 Hence, the following 
analysis can still be considered as identifying priority concerns for further legislation 
in the area of minority rights. 
1. New national minorities 
The situation of new national minorities is most directly affected by the dissolution of 
the constitutional framework of the SFRJ and by the ensuing logic of nationalism 
inherent in the constitution of the FRY; it has become an integral part of the conflict-
ridden triadic relation of national minorities, nationalising states and external national 
homelands (see supra I.A.3.). An example of a minority group affected in this way are 
                                                
50 See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Annual Report 2000. Vienna: IHF at 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/hce/HCSreport2000part10.htm. 
51 For the definition of types of minorities in the FRY see supra I, B.1. 
52 See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001, Report on Racial Discrimination, 
Vienna: IHF at http://www.helsinki.org.yu/hcs/HCSreport20010510.htm. 
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the Croats, who under the constitutional framework of the SFRJ were represented in 
the federal organs as a "nation". Within the legal system of the FRY, Croats are not 
considered a "nationality" and are therefore denied recognition as a minority in 
federal and republic and AP legislation. Although Art. 8 of the AGREEMENT ON THE 
NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA of 23 August 1996 contains an implicit 
acknowledgement of the existence of a Croat minority in the FRY, non-recognition of 
the Croat minority has been the explicit policy of state authorities. Correspondingly, 
Croats do not enjoy the rights granted to other "nationalities" in the FRY, mos  
notably linguistic and educational rights. As a consequence, the Bishop Classical 
Gymnasium "Paulinum" run by the Roman Catholic Church in Subotica is the only 
institution providing mother-tongue instruction for Croats in the FRY. Similarly, 
Croats are deprived of the right to programmes in their own language, although local 
Radio Subotica has recently introduced a daily one-hour programme in Croatian. 
Political participation of Croats is restricted to the municipal level, and even where 
Croats constitute a numerical majority, they are under-represented in the respective 
administrative organs, because the main Croat political organisation, the Democratic 
Alliance of Croats in the Vojvodina (DSHV), is systematically impeded by the 
authorities to pursue its activities. Most importantly, Croats from Bosnia who 
immigrated into regions populated by Croat relatives in the FRY, especially in 
Vojvodina, in the course of the war over Bosnia, are sometimes denied citizenship 
with the justification that they enjo  citizenship rights in Crotia.53 
2. Old national minorities 
The government of the FRY claims that, in general, the situation of old national 
minorities is satisfying and that the constitutional rights are implemented in practice. 
However, minority associations as well as their external homelands have complained 
about hostilities of public authorities as well as about increased inter-ethnic tensions 
in society.  
 
                                                
53 On the situation of Croats, see the report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/8 (25 October 1996), paras 68-70; see also Humanitarian Law 
Center 1999. "Human Rights in FR Yugoslavia" (Spotlight Report No. 28), January 1999, Belgrade, p. 
44. 
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It is true that there are few complaints about the situation of Romanians in the FRY, 
who live primarily in Vojvodina and in the Banat region; according to government 
information, ten municipalities have established Romanian as a language of 
instruction at the elementary level, and two at secondary level.54 Yet, th  Vlachs, i.e. 
Romanians in the Southern Danube area, who are not recognised as a "nationality" by 
Serb authorities, suffer from restrictions of their cultural autonomy with regard to 
language use, religious organisation, education, and public media.55 Turks, who were 
recognised as a national minority under the 1974 constitution and were put on an 
equal footing with Albanians and Serbs under the legislation of the SAP Kosovo, have 
experienced discrimination at various levels since the dissolution of the SFRJ. Not 
only were their rights curtailed in the process of legal re-organisation of the AP 
Kosovo and Metohija, but the conditions of the 1991 census also led to a 
misrepresentation of their factual number in Kosovo.56 Since the end of the Kosovo 
war, the Turkish minority has experienced constant pressure from the Albanian 
majority and, in particular, from the UÇK, which has expropriated social facilities of 
the Turkish community for their own use.57 Complaints about mistreatment are also 
articulated by the Bulgarian minority; thus, it was alleged th t local authorities 
discouraged teachers and pupils from using the Bulgarian language in school.58 Of 
particular concern was the compulsory military mobilisation of Bulgarians in the 
course of the Kosovo war as well as the imprisonment of Dr Marko Shukarev, 
Chairman of the Democratic Union of the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia.59 
Case 1: Hungarians in Vojvodina 
The situation of Hungarians in Vojvodina is particularly affected by continuous 
                                                
54 See government information UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996), p. 19; UN doc. 
CERD/C/299/Add. 17 (31 July 1997), para 74. 
55 Information provided by the Movement of Romanians and Vlachs from Yugoslavia (Miºcarea 
Românilor – Valahilor din Iugoslavia) in a letter to the Council of Europe, dated 4 February 1999. 
56 Information provided by the Turkish Democratic League (Türk Demokratik Birliði Partisi) in a letter 
to the Council of Europe, dated 10 February 1999. 
57 On this question see the Statement by Ambassador Eralp at the Permanent Council, OSCE doc. 
PC.DEL/418/99 (2 September 1999). According to the government of the FRY, however, mother-
tongue instruction in Turkish was attended in 11 elementary and five secondary schools in Kosovo; see 
UN doc. CERD/C/364 (26 January 1999), para 13. 
58 UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/8 (25 October 1996), para. 94.
59 Information provided by the Helsinki Committee Human Rights of Bulgarians in Yugoslavia in a 
letter to the Council of Europe, dated 11 June 1999. On the situation of Bulgarians, see also 
Humanitarian Law Center 1999, pp. 44-45. 
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demographic change caused by the influx of Serbian refugees in the region (see supra
I.B.2.). As a consequence, majority-minority relations have changed in many 
municipalities to the disadvantage of the Hungarian community. However, the 
government of the FRY claims that minority rights are guaranteed in practice. For 
instance, 29 of the 45 townships in the AP Vojvodina have decided to establish 
Hungarian as a language of instruction in elementary schools and 27 in secondary 
schools.60 Education in Hungarian is correspondingly provided  in 83 of 345 
elementary schools and 28 of the 112 secondary schools in the province. Yet, the 
curricula, which are drawn up by the Serbian Ministry of Education without prior 
consultation with minority representatives, lack sufficient reference to national 
culture. Similarly, the status of Hungarian as an official language is not appropriately 
respected in practice, as evidenced by the lack of bilingual topographic signs and 
obstacles in using the Hungarian language in court proceedings.61 
 
In response to this situation, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) with 
support of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DZVM) 
published a proposal for an AGREEMENT OF THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF SELF-
RULE IN VOJVODINA in December 1998, which urges the respect of the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities to preserve their cultural identity, proposes to re-
define the constitutional status of the AP Vojvodina and calls for the creation of an 
ombudsman's office for the protection of minorities.62 The Canada-based organisation 
Human Rights for Minorities in Central Europe (Vancouver Society) has gone beyond 
these claims by calling for a revision of the borders established by the Treaty of 
Trianon (1920), in order to guarantee the cultural autonomy of Vojvodina 
Hungarians.63  
                                                
60 Government information in UN doc. A/51/203, E/1996/86 (10 July 1996), p. 19; UN doc. 
CERD/C/299/Add. 17 (31 July 1997), para 74. 
61 See Humanitarian Law Center 1999, pp. 42-43 and Minority Protection Association 1997, "The 
Minority Rights of the Hungarian National Group in Yugoslavia. Legal Framework and Actual 
Practice" (Minority Protection Series, No. 3). See also Poulton 1993, pp. 216-218. 
62 See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Report on the Status of Human Rights in Serbia 
in 1998, Vienna: IHF. 
63 See the "Memorandum on the Situation of the Ethnic Hungarian Minority in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia",  presented to His Excellency Da iel Tarschys, Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe by the Human Rights for Minorities in Central Europe, Vancouver Society (16 August 1999), 
p.16. It is obvious that such an option would escalate the conflict over the Hungarian minority to the 
degree of open inter-state confrontation. 
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3. Ethnic minorities 
Ethnic minorities have been affected by Serbian nationalism in a way similar to old 
national minorities. Additionally,  their position is weakened both by the fact that they 
cannot rely on an external national homeland as defender of their rights and by their 
non-recognition as a national minority under the new constitutions of the FRY and its 
constituent republics.  
Case 2: Muslims in Sandž ak 
As already mentioned, Muslims in the Sandžak region, i.e. in the Serbian Raška 
District and in northern Montenegro, were not considered a "nation" in the SFRJ. It 
was only after the dissolution of the SFRJ that the Sandžak Muslims started to call 
themselves Bosniaks. Despite their de factostatus as a minority, the government of 
the FRY explicitly refuses to recognise the Sandžak Muslims as a national minority, 
since it considers them to be Serbs professing the Islamic faith.64 As a consequence, 
the Muslim minority does not enjoy any cultural autonomy which would include, for 
instance, separate educational institutions. In the political atmosphere of Serbian 
nationalism, the Sandžak Muslims have also been subject to discrimination in 
personnel policy and in public media. As consequence of the atrocities committed in 
the wake of the war over Bosnia between 1992 and 1994 and of the influx of Serbian 
refugees from Gorazde, UN Special Rapporteur Jiri Dienstbier noted increased inter-
ethnic tensions, which led to the emigration of a considerable number of Sandžak 
Muslims.65 
 
Of particular concern is the fate of Dr Sülejman Uglijanin, President of the National 
Council of Bosniaks in Sandžak and leader of the Muslim political movement for 
autonomy of the Sandžak, whose parliamentary immunity was removed in the course 
of the political controversy over the municipality Novi Pazar. In 1997, Serbian 
authorities ordered the destitution of the Mayor of Novi Pazar and the removal of the 
municipal council in which the political organisation of Muslims, the "List for 
                                                
64 See government information provided in its "Comments of the Government of the FRY on the parts 
of the report of the Special Rapporteur E. Rehn on the situation of human rights in the former 
Yugoslavia and the report on minorities relating to the FRY" (1997), I. G. 
65 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/42 (20 January 1999), para. 102. See also Poulton 1993, pp. 218f. 
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Sandžak – Dr Sülejman Uglijanin" had won 33 of the 47 seats in the November 1996 
elections.66 That the interim administration imposed by Serbian authorities was ruled 
in accordance with the law in a Constitutional Court decision (14 May 1998), shows 
that legal redress is far from being available for non-Serbia  citizens. 
Correspondingly, the incident was brought to the attention of the CoE’s Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities of Europe in s ring 1997.67 
4. Dispersed minorities 
Compared to ethnic minorities described above, the situation of dispersed minorities 
is even worse, since they are not only not recognised as a national minority but are 
generally not represented in local politicab dies. 
Case 3: Roma 
Roma, probably the most vulnerable minority in South East Europe in general, are 
dramatically affected by economic decline in the FRY. Due to massive poverty 
against which the government has not initiated any kind of affirmative action, some 
children froze to death in 1998. In the educational domain, there have been attempts 
to provide for instruction in the Roma language in Obrovac and in Tovariševo, two 
villages in the Vojvodina, but the concern of public authorities about education of this 
community is still not very high.68 
 
Roma have also been subject to violence by police and private citizens in the FRY, 
particularly in Kosovo. Whereas there were an estimated number of 150.000 Roma 
and Ashkali in 1990, in the course of the Kosovo conflict Roma were victims to 
massive expulsion, first by Serbian forces and later by the UÇK on the pretext that 
they had collaborated with Serbian police during the war. As a consequence, almost 
all Roma settlements were destroyed during the war.69 
                                                
66 On this event, see Humanitarian Law Center 1999, P. 38. 
67 See CG/BUR (4) 19 (7 August 1997); CG/BUR (4) 19/Addendum Nr. 1 (27 August 1997); CG/BUR 
(4) 37 (18 September 1997). 
68 See Humanitarian Law Center 1999, p. 40. 
69 This has been concluded by the Fact-Finding Mission of Tilman Zülch in August 1999; see "Until 
the Very Last 'Gipsy' Has Fled the Country  - Mass Expulsion of Roma and Ashkali from Kosovo" in: 
Human Rights Report No. 21, Göttingen: Society for Threatened Peoples International, 1999. 
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5. Kosovo 
The scope of this paper does not allow a detailed analysis of the Kosovo conflict as it 
developed during the 1990s.70 The aforementioned abolition of territorial autonomy by 
the Serbian government (see supra I.A.2. and II.A.3.(a)) led to a systematic boycott 
by Albanians of all federal and republic institutions, to which the Serbian government 
responded by open repression and discrimination. Almost the entire Albanian staff of 
the public educational system as well as of the administration were dismissed, and 
mother-tongue instruction was prevented at all levels.71 The government however 
argues that the Albanians left the public educational system of their own free will.72 
Despite several attempts to arrive at political compromise, most notably the signing of 
a Memorandum on Understanding concerning the educational system in Kosovo, 
signed by Miloševiæ and Rugova on 1 September 1996,73 the situation aggravated to a 
degree that several thousands of Kosovo Albanians left the country. It should be noted 
that, although not comparable to the situation of the Albanian population of Kosovo, 
the situation of Albanians in southern Serbia has also deteriorated as a consequence of 
the Kosovo conflict.74 
 
From 1996, the Kosovo conflict took on the form of armed confrontation between he 
so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK)75 and Serbian police and military forces, in 
the course of which casualties and atrocities on both sides were reported. In 
continuous disregard of international standards as well as domestic law, Serbian state 
security forces reportedly used excessive force including mass arrest, arbitrary 
                                                
70 For informative analyses in the Kosovo conflict see e.g. Ramet 1999, pp.297-327; Troebst, Stefan 
1998, "Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation,1992-1998" (ECMI 
Working Paper #1), Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.  
71  See Humanitarian Law Center 1999, pp. 34-36. 
72 See government information UN doc. CERD/C/364 (26 January 1999), para. 4. According to the 
same source, public information in Albanian was available; see ib d., paras 16-18. 
73 On this agreement which was brokered by the NGO Comunità di Sant'Egidio, see Troebst 1998a, p. 
10 and for the text ibid., p. 77. 
74 See on the Albani ns in southern Serbia, esp. Brunnbauer, Ulf 1999, "Die vergessenen Albaner 
Serbiens. Zur Lage der ethnischen Albaner in Südserbien außerhalb des Kosovo", Sü o teur pa 48 (7-
8): 373-388. 
75 Roots of the UÇK can be found in the underground organisations with n alistic or communist-
nationalistic political goals, especially in the "People's Movement Kosovo" (LPK), which since its 
foundation in 1982 proclaimed violence as the only means to achieve territorial autonomy and gained 
popular support in November 1995, when the Dayton Agreement failed to address the Kosovo problem. 
On the UÇK, see Reuter, Jens 1999, "Wer ist die UCK?", in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale 
Politik März 1999, pp. 281-285. 
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detention, and pre-trial torture.76 While the government of the FRY continued to 
legitimate the use of force as defence against terrorist activities,77 Western powers 
increased pressure on Serbia after the Drenica massacre in February 1998. After 
several failed attempts at mediation – ncluding the Miloševiæ-Holbrooke Agreement 
(13 October 1998), the Agreement on the OSCE Verification Mission (16 October 
1998), the Joint Draft Agreement on the Political Framework of Self-Rule in Kosovo 
and Metohija (20 November 1998) and the negotiations in Rambouillet (March 1999) 
– NATO decided to carry out an air campaign, which lasted from March until June 
1999.78 During the war Serbian forces accelerated their operation of expelling 
Albanian civilians from their villages by violence, while the UÇK continued its 
counter-attack against Serbian civilians. As a consequence, the human rights situation 
dramatically deteriorated with the start of the NATO intervention.79 After the war, 
human rights violations have by no means ceased to occur in Kosovo. According to 
the UN Special Rapporteur Jiri Dienstbier, the "ethnic concentration process" in 
Kosovo has rather continued despite the presence of UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE; thus, 
he states that since June 1999 there have been 250,000 displaced persons including 
Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks and Albanians fearful of charges of "collaboration".80 With the 
recently established Kosovo Interim Administrative Council not being recognised by 
                                                
76 See e.g. report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights UN doc. 
A/53/322 (11 September 1998), paras 82-90. 
77 On government charges against Albanian terrorists seeking the establishment of an ethnically pure 
"Greater Albania" see the "Comments of the Government of the FRY on the parts of the report of the 
Special Rapporteur E. Rehn on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia and the report on 
minorities relating to the FRY" (1997), II. C. 
UN doc. CERD/C/364 (26 January 1999), para. 25-42. 
78 Western policy in the Kosovo conflict has been subject to much criticism; see for instance Bougarel, 
Xavier 1999 "Dans les Balkans, dix années d'erreurs et d'arrière-p nsées", in: Le Monde Diplomatique 
No 546 (Septembre 1999), p. 10-11. With the end of the Kosovo war it seems possible to develop a 
more consistent strategy for stability and development in South East Europe; see infra IV. 
79 Thus the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission for Human Rights contends "[...] that NATO air 
strikes not only failed to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, as evidenced by the hundreds of 
thousands of persons who fled the province, but did non prevent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and Serbian forces from conducting a systematic campaign of terror that quantitatively differed from 
the armed activity in the months immediately preceding the war and that began in full ferocity with the 
start of the NATO campaign", UN doc. A/54/396, S/1999/1000 (24 October 1999), para. 98, a view 
supported by many human rights activists (see ibid., para 127). He also notes that the war also affected 
the human rights situation in Serbia by the introduction of martial law, curtailments of the freedom of 
expression, and the aggravation of the refugee problem within Serbia; see ib d., paras 95 and 100. 
80 UN doc. A/54/396/Add.1 (3 November 1999), para. 26. He concludes by saying that "the spring 
ethnic cleansing of Albanians accompanied by murder, torture, looting and burning of houses has been 
replaced by the fall ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks and other non-Albanians accompanied 
by the same atrocities. "Death to the Serbs!" is the most common wall inscription now. Our problem is 
that this is now happening in the presence of UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE"; ibi , para. 34.
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the Serbian authorities,81 neither the legal nor the factual position of minorities in 
Kosovo is foreseeable. 
                                                
81 See RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 3, No. 243 Part II (16 December 1999). 
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III . Evaluation of the Situation of Minorities in the FRY 
This section evaluates the domestic legal provisions and factual practices pertaining to 
the protection of minorities in the FRY from the perspective of the Council of 
Europe's FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES. 
It is assumed that such an evaluation, in order to instruct long-term political strategies, 
should be situated not only within the larger context of social transformations in South 
East Europe (see infra I.A.) but also within the development of normative standards at 
the international level. Therefore, the first subsection gives an overview of the trends 
relating to minority protection in international law, within which the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION can be interpreted (A.). The second subsection provides a systematic 
comparison of the legal standards contained in the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION with the 
respective domestic legal provisions and factual practices in the FRY (B.). 
A. The normative framework: the protection of minorities through international 
law 
The Council of Europe's FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
NATIONAL MINORITIES is the first legally binding international instrument devoted to 
minority protection in general. Since its legal standards are to be interpted within 
the wider normative framework of human rights, the following subsection reviews the 
general evolution of the rights of persons belonging to minorities in international law 
(1.) and then systematises the legal standards formulated in the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION (2.). 
1. The evolution of minority rights in international law 
Early provisions concerning the legal position of minorities can be found in some 
international treaties in the 19th century and, at the end of the First World War, in 
bilateral minorities treaties overseen by the League of Nations and aimed at protecting 
national minorities, especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Granting persons 
belonging to minorities the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, the right to 
citizenship and the right to establish schools and other institutions in order to preserve 
their national peculiarities, these treaties obliged the state to respect and, in some cases, 
even to promote the identity of minorities. In combination with the right to national 
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self-determination, however, this system of minority protection contributed to inter-
state conflict in the inter-war period and was therefore abandoned after the Second 
World War. As a consequence, minority rights were conceptualised within the wi er 
normative framework of universal human rights. Thus, the UN General Assembly 
asked the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights to elaborate more specific provisions 
on the rights of members of minorities as early as 1948. As a result of four decades of 
debate, the UN General Assembly adopted the DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC 
MINORITIES (UN DECLARATION) on 18 December 1992.82 It has been a prevailing 
trend in international legal standard-setting in the area of minority protection not to 
regard groups but the individual as subject of the rights in question. At the same time, 
the object of these rights has successively been xtended in so far as the state – their 
major addressee – is obliged to respect, protect and promote not only the rights to 
non-discrimination and equality but also the right to cultural identity. 
 
The basic principles of non-discrimination and equality re proclaimed in Art. 2 (1.) 
of the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in Resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 1948. They are re-stated in Art. 2 
(1.) and Art. 26 of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
(ICCPR), adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19 December 1966.83 Some 
implications of these two principles for the treatment of minorities are addressed in a 
number of declarations and conventions. The first international convention addressing 
expressis verbis some of the rights of members of minorities is the UNESCO 
CONVENTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION, adopted on 14 December 
1960, which stipulates in Article 5(1.) that "[i]t is essential to recognise the right of 
members of national minorities to carry out their own educational activities [...]".84 
Similarly, the INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, on the basis of a broad definition of "racial discrimination", 
                                                
82 UN doc. A/RES/47/135 (18 December 1992). On the development of minority protection under the 
UN, see e.g. Bloch, Anne-Christine 1995, "Minorities and Indigeous Peoples", pp. 309-231 in: Eide, 
Asbjorn et al. (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Textbook, Dordrecht/Boston/London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers;  
83 UN doc. A/RES/2200A(XXI) (16 December 1966).
84 UNTS, vol. 429: p. 93. 
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confirms the principle of non-discrimination of minorities.85 The most important 
legally binding provision referring to minority rights is Art. 27 of the ICCPR, which 
presupposes the prohibition of any discrimination based on ethnicity, religion and 
language and obliges the state not to interfere in the affairs of minorities:  
 
Art. 27 In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language. 
 
The prevailing definition of the term "minority" as used in Art. 27 of the ICCPR 
comprises both objective criteria (numerical inferiority, non-d mina t position in 
society) and subjective criteria, most notably the will of members of the group to 
express their cultural identity.86 By means of the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality, however, states are not clearly obliged to adopt any pro-active measures for 
the protection of thus-defined minorities. Following the historical events of 1989, 
international legal discourse has therefore acknowledged the right to cultural identity, 
thus recognising the necessity to develop more effective means of protecting the 
identity of minorities and extending the individualist understanding of human rights in 
so far as the right to cultural identity can only be enjoyed in community with others.87 
The first comprehensive and universal standard-setting international declaration 
acknowledging the necessity to promote minority identities and explicating the 
corresponding rights of members of minorities is the aforementioned UN 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, 
RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES.88 It goes beyond the principles of non-
                                                
85 UN doc. A/RES/2106(XX) (21 December 1965). 
86 See especially Capotorti, Francesco 1977, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, paras. 560-568. See also 
Scherer-Leydecker, Christian 1997, Minderheiten und sonstige ethnische Gruppen. Eine Studie zur 
kulturellen Identität im Völkerrecht (Menschenrechtszentrum der Universität Potsdam, Band 4), Berlin: 
Arno Spitz Verlag, pp. 227ff. 
87 See Stavenhagen, Rudolfo 1995, "Cultural Rights and Universal Human Rights", pp. 63-77 in: Eide, 
Asbjorn et al. (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Textbook, Dordrecht/Boston/London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Beetham, David 1998, "Democracy and Human Rights: Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural", pp. 71-97 in Symonides, Janusz (ed.) Human Rights: New Dimensions 
and Challenges, Aldershot: Ashgate/UNESCO; Symonides, Janusz 1998, “Cultural rights: a neglected 
category of human rights”, in: International Social Science Journal 158: pp. 559- 73. 
88 See Thornberry, Patrick 1995, "The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, and an Update", pp. 13-76 in: A. 
Philipps and A. Rosas (eds) Universal Minority Rights, Turku/Abo: Abo Akademi University. Institute 
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discrimination and equality by obliging the state to pro- ctively espect, protect and 
promote the identity of minorities. As a programmatic provision, this declaration 
states in Article 1(1.): 
 
Art. 1 (1) States shall protect the existence and the national or 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within 
their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the 
promotion of that identity. 
 
 
The concern for the promotion of the identity of minorities as expressed in this 
declaration is reformulated in other recent international human rights provisions, such 
as paragraph 19 of the VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, adopted 
by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993.89 A similar 
understanding of the rights of members of minorities to preserve their cultural identity 
has emerged at the European level during the past decade. For instance, the 
DOCUMENT OF THE COPENHAGEN MEETING ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE 
CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, adopted on 29 June 1990, 
urges member States to protect and promote the identity of minorities on their 
respective territory on the basis of the principles of non-discrimination and equality.  
 
This general development of formulating state obligations pertaining to the respect, 
the protection and the promotion of rights to non-di crimination, equality and cultural 
identity demonstrates that the classical concept of the nation-state with its assumption 
of a neat congruency between territorial sovereignty and national identity is 
increasingly de-legitimised at the international level. The creation of culturally 
homogenous societies through exclusion or assimilation is no longer a legitimate 
project of the modern democratic state. Obliged to respect, protect and promote not 
only the individual's civil and political rights but also his or her cultural rights, states 
are rather expected to create an institutional framework for achieving what Asbjørn 
Eide has called "pluralism n togetherness".90 As far as minorities are concerned, this 
                                                                                                                                            
for Human Rights. 
89UN doc. A/CONF.157/24. 
90 Eide, Asbjørn 1994, Peaceful and Constructive Resolution of Situations Involving Minorities, Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights; Eide, Asbjørn 1995, “Cultural Rights as Individual Human 
Rights”, pp. 229- 40 in: A. Eide, C. Krause, and A. Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
A Textbook, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. See similarly Beetham 1998, p. 
 45
idea of a multicultural democratic state implies a preference for forms of cultural 
autonomy that are based on the principle of personality (Personalitätsprinzip) rather 
than on claims to territorial autonomy. It is in this wider normative framework that the 
Council of Europe has adopted the EUROPEAN CHARTER FOR REGIONAL OR MINORITY 
LANGUAGES (2 December 1992) and the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES (10 November 1994). 
2. The FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
M INORITIES  
As early as in 1973 the Committee of Government Experts of the Council of Europe 
considered a draft additional protocol to the ECHR pertaining to the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. Yet it was only after the historical events in 1989 that this 
long-standing concern for the rights of persons belonging to minorities was taken up 
again by the Council of Europe. In 1990, the Parliamentary Assembly prepared a list 
of principles of minority protection and called for an additional protocol to the ECHR, 
which should be devoted to the protection of minorities.91 At the Vienna Summit on 
8/9 October 1993, however, the Heads of State and Government of the Council of 
Europe decided to draft a framework convention instead of elaborating an additional 
protocol to the ECHR. The Committee of Ministers then established an Ad-Hoc-
Committee for the Protection of National Minorities (CAHMIN) which carried out the 
drafting work in 1994. The FRAMEWORK CONVENTION was adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 10 November 1994 and opened for signature on 11 February 1995. It 
entered into force on 1 February 1998 after the required number of 12 member states 
had ratified the convention.92  
 
                                                                                                                                            
93 and König, Matthias 1999, "Cultural diversity and language policy", in: International Social Science 
Journal 161: pp. 401-408. 
91 See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1134 (1990), Resolution 1177 (1992) and 
Resolution 1201 (1993). 
92 On the history and content of the Council of Europe's FRAMEWORK CONVENTION see Benoît-
Rohmer, Florence 1998, "Le Conseil de l'Europe et Les Minorités Nationales", pp. 128-148 in: K. 
Malfliet and R. Laenen (eds) Minority Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Link Between 
Domestic Policy, Foreign Policy and European Integration, Leuven: The Institute for European Policy;  
Estébanez, María Amor Martín and Kinga Gál 1998, "Implementing the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities" (ECMI Report #3), Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 
pp. 8-10; and Troebst, Stefan 1998, "The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities Revisited" (ECMI Working Paper #2), Flensburg: European Centre 
for Minority Issues. 
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The content of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION is divided into four major sections. 
Section I sets out some introductory provisions which emphasise the individualistic 
approach to minority rights by placing them in the context of international human 
rights protection (Art. 1) and guarantee the individual's right to be treated as a 
member of a minority or not (Art. 3). Section II as operative part of the convention 
lays down the detailed provisions pertaining to the protection of minorities, including 
general provisions on the rights to non-discrimination, to equality and to cultural 
identity (Art. 4-6) as well as more specific provisions such as the right to assembly 
and association (Art. 7), freedom of religion (Art. 8), rights to access to and use of 
media (Art. 9), linguistic rights (Art. 10 and 11), educational rights (Art. 12-14), rights 
to participation in cultural life (Art. 15), the prohibition of altering the proportions of 
the population (Art. 16), rights to cross-border contact (Art. 17), international 
cooperation (Art. 18) and the conditions for restricting these rights (Art. 19). Section 
III highlights some principles guiding the interpretation of the convention such as e.g. 
the respect for territorial integrity (Art. 21), and Section IV lays down the mechanism 
of implementing the convention. 
 
It is one of the characteristics of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION that it includes only 
programme-type provisions which leave the State Parties a measure of discretion in 
interpreting and implementing the standards contained in Section II of the 
convention.93 Of particular importance in this respect is that the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION contains no definition of the term "national minority", which leaves 
governments the power of imposing  their own definitions of the term.94 As a 
consequence, the monitoring process, which under the rules of the Committee of 
Ministers Resolution (97) 10 is monitored by the Committee of Ministers with the 
support of an Advisory Committee, has been regarded as a crucial element of the 
                                                
93 On the following criticisms of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION see Troebst 1998b, pp. 6-11. On the 
basis of such criticism, some authors even argue that minority protection should remain under the 
competency of the OSCE; see Gilb rt, Geoff 1999, "Minority Rights Under the Council of Europe", pp. 
53-70 in: P. Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds) Minority Rights in the "New" Europe, The Hague et al.: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
94 Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Slovenia and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
for instance, have formulated interpretative declarations in addition to their ratification, in which 
minorities are listed to which the term "national minority" is to be applied. It should be mentioned that 
the Russian Federation has, however, explicitly criticised this practice of unilateral interpretative 
declarations or reservations; see Troebst 1998b, p.7f. 
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implementation of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION.95 Furthermore, the wording of the 
convention has been criticised for being too vague and weak; in fact, several  
provisions contain a number of escape clauses and thereby prevent the clear 
formulation of state obligations.96  
 
Despite these shortcomings the Council of Europe's FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, if 
interpreted within the larger normative framework of international minority 
protection, is an important political step in institutionalising a model of democracy 
which embraces cultural diversity, de-legitimises the classical concept of the nation-
state with its assumptions of territorial sovereignty and cultural homogeneity and 
thereby provides a framework in which persons belonging to minorities may enjoy 
rights to cultural autonomy.  
B. Evaluating the situation of minorities in the FRY from the perspective of the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
The following chart (table 4) systematises the results of the detailed analyses of the 
de jure and de facto situation of minorities in the FRY in Section II by comparing 
their constitutional position, the state's general policy and the factual situation with 
the respective legal provisions contained in the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION. In this 
chart, the term "minority" is used as an umbrella term to encompass what is called 
"national minority" in the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION and "nationality" or "ethnic 
group" in the constitutions of the FRY and its constituent republics. In addition to the 
three categories of international co-operation, the definition of the term "(national) 
minority" and general provisions, it distinguishes six specific objects of minority 
rights (territory, political participation, language, education, media/culture, religion), 
which are analysed with respect to the nature of state obligations they involve (i.e. 
respect, protection, or promotion).  
                                                
95 See Estébanez/Gál 1998, pp. 26-54; Weckerling, Matthias 1997, "Der Durchführungsmechanismus 
des Rahmenübereinkommens des Europarates zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten", in: Europäische 
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 24: pp. 605-608.  
96 See especially the criticism of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in Recommendation 
1255 (1995). 
 48
 
Table 4: Systematisation of the constitutional, legislative and factual situation of 
minorities in the FRY, compared to the standards of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
  
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
 
 
Constitutions FRY, Republic 
of Serbia and Republic of 
Montenegro 
 
 
Infrastructure and general 
p licy in FRY 
 
Factual situation in 
FRY 
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
co
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n 
# minority protection as 
integral part of 
international cooperation 
(Art. 1) 
# recognition of international 
human rights (FRY Art. 10) or 
international minority rights 
(Montenegro Art. 67); 
incorporation of international 
law into internal legal order 
(FRY Art. 16) 
 
# ttempts at international 
cooperation (CERD, UN 
Special Rapporteur); 
ratification of Framework 
Convention 
# member of UN; 
member of OSCE; 
Special Guest to the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly CoE 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 o
f 
"m
in
o
ri
ty
" 
# no definition 
 
 
# respect for right to be 
treated as member of 
minority or not (Art. 3.1)
 
# no definition 
 
 
# respect for right not to be 
treated as member of minority 
(FRY Art. 45 (2.)) 
 
# state policy based on 
definitions of "nationality" 
in SFRJ 
 
# non-recognition of 
some new national 
minorities (e.g. Croats) 
and certain old national 
minorities (e.g. 
Vlachs), and ethnic 
groups (Serb Muslims) 
 
G
e
n
e
ra
l p
ro
v
is
io
n
s 
# respect for minority 
members' right to equality 
and non-discrimination 
(Art. 4 (1.)) 
 
# promotion of right to 
equality (Art. 4 (2.)) 
 
# promotion of right to 
cultural identity (Art. 5) 
 
 
 
 
# protection of right to 
equality, non-
discrimination and cultural 
identity from acts of 
intolerance (Art. 6) 
# respect for citizens' right to 
equality (FRY Art. 20) 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
# respect for right to cultural 
identity (FRY Art. 11)  
 
 
 
 
# protection of right to 
equality, non-discrimination 
and cultural identity from acts 
of intolerance (FRY Art. 38 
(2.), 42 (1.), Art. 50) 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
# Republic Council for the 
Protection of the Rights of 
Members of National and 
Ethnic Groups 
(Montenegro Art. 76) 
 
# implemented through 
several Serbian laws with 
the effect of restricted 
freedom of expression 
# harsh discrimination 
of some groups, most 
notably new national 
minorities (Croats) and 
dispersed minorities 
(Roma). 
 
 
# general trend after 
dissolution of the 
SFRY: restrictions of 
cultural autonomy 
 
 
# insufficient 
protection of minorities 
from social pressure by 
Serb refugees 
T
e
rr
it
o
ri
a
l 
p
ro
v
is
io
n
s
 
# respect for proportions of 
minority populations (Art. 
16) 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
# limited territorial autonomy 
of Autonomous Provinces 
Kosovo-Metohija and 
Vojvodina (Serbia Art. 109-
112) 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
# in AP Kosovo and 
Metohija application of 
Serbian LAW ON THE 
PROCEDURE OF 
REPUBLICAN ORGANS 
UNDER SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES; 
in Vojvodina STATUTE OF 
THE AUTONOMOUS 
PROVINCE OF VOJVODINA 
 
# alteration of ethnic 
proportions in 
Vojvodina and 
Sandžak due to 
refugees 
 
# territorial conflict 
over Kosovo; 
repression of 
secessionist movement 
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P
o
lit
ic
a
l 
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 
 
# respect for right to 
freedom of assembly and 
association (Art.7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# respect for right to cross-
border contact (Art.17) 
 
# respect for right to freedom 
of assembly and association 
(FRY Art. 41; Serbia Art. 44); 
respect for right to 
proportional representation in 
administration (Montenegro, 
Art. 73) 
 
 
 
 
# respect for right to cross-
border contact (FRY Art. 48) 
# representation of 
Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians (SVM) and 
"List of Sandžak" in 
federal and republican 
parliaments 
 
 
 
 
 
# prohibition of external 
financial support of 
political organisations of 
minorities in Serbia 
 
# restricted political 
representation of  
certain minorities (e.g. 
Croats, Roma); 
repression of Albanian 
political organisations 
in AP Kosovo-
Metohija; removal of 
Muslim-led Municipal 
Council in Novi Pazar 
 
/ 
La
n
g
u
a
g
e 
# respect for right to use 
minority language in 
private and public (Art. 10 
(1.); Art. 11 (2.)) 
 
 
# respect for right to use 
minority language in 
relation with 
administrative authorities 
(Art. 10 (2.)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# respect for right to be 
informed in one's own 
language in public 
proceedings (Art. 10 (3.))
 
 
# respect for right to use 
surname and first name in 
minority language (Art. 11 
(1.)) 
 
# promotion of right to use 
of minority language 
through bilingual signs 
(Art. 11 (3.)) 
 
# respect for right to use 
minority language in private 
and public (FRY Art. 45 (1.); 
Serbia Art. 49; Montenegro 
Art. 68) 
 
# stablishment of additional 
official languages in regions 
inhabited by minorities (FRY 
Art. 15 (2.); Montenegro Art. 
9); Hungarian, Slovak, 
Romanian and Ruthenian as 
official languages in 
Vojvodina (STATUTE OF THE 
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF 
VOJVODINA Art. 6) 
 
# respect for right to be 
informed in one's own 
anguage in public proceedings 
(FRY Art. 49; Serbia Art. 123) 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
/ 
# implemented through  
Serbian LAW ON THE 
OFFICIAL USE OF 
LANGUAGES AND SCRIPTS 
 
 
# minority languages can 
ly be declared official 
languages at local level 
(Serbian LAW Art. 11); 
Serbian always primary 
official language in public 
proceedings except in the 
first instance (Serbian LAW 
Art. 12 (1.) and 15) 
 
 
# implemented through 
Serbian LAW (Art. 6) 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
# implemented through 
Serbian LAW (Art. 19 and 
20) 
# basically no 
restrictions 
 
 
 
 
# in AP Kosovo and 
Metohija unequal 
status of Serbian, 
Albanian and Turkish 
language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# lack of interpreters in 
some courts in 
Vojvodina 
 
 
 
  / 
 
 
 
 
# lack of bilingual 
signs in some 
municipalities in 
Vojvodina 
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E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n 
# respect for right to equal 
access to education of 
minorities (Art. 12 (3.)) 
 
# promotion of knowledge 
about minority culture 
(Art. 12 (1.) and (2.)) 
 
 
# respect for right of 
members of minorities to 
establish separate 
educational institutions, 
without financial 
obligations of  the state 
(Art. 13) 
 
# respect for right of 
members of minorities to 
learn minority language 
(Art. 14 (1.)); respect for 
right of members of 
minorities to receive 
education in minority 
language or mother-tongue 
instruction  (Art. 14 (2.) 
and (3.)) 
# respect for right to equality 
(see supra) 
 
 
# promotion of knowledge 
about minority culture through 
curricula (Montenegro Art. 71) 
 
 
# respect for right of members 
of minorities to establish 
separate educational 
i titutions, with possibility of 
financial support from the state 
(FRY Art. 47), with financial 
support (Montenegro Art. 70) 
 
# respect for right to use 
minority language in education 
(FRY Art. 46 (1.)); respect for 
right to receive mother- ongue 
education (Serbia Art. 32 (4.); 
Montenegro Art. 68) 
/ 
 
 
 
# curricula drawn by 
Serbian Ministry of 
Education without prior 
consultation with minority 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# Serbian language 
established as primary 
language of instruction 
(provisions in Serbian LAW 
ON ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, 
LAW ON SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS, LAW ON HIGHER 
SCHOOLS, LAW ON 
UNIVERSITIES); mother-
tongue or bilingual 
instruction at a minimum 
of 15 pupils or on approval 
of Ministry of Education 
(provisions in Serbian 
LAWS see supra) 
 
# "parallel" educational 
institutions in AP 
Kosovo-Metohija 
 
# insufficient reference 
to national culture of 
Hungarians in 
Vojvodina 
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# no mother-tongue 
instruction for Croats 
n public schools; use 
of Bulgarian 
discouraged by local 
authorities; no 
language education for 
Vlachs 
C
u
lt
u
re
 a
n
d
 M
e
d
ia
 
# respect for right to 
receive and import 
information in minority 
language  (Art. 9 (1.) and 
(4.)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# respect for right of 
members of minorities to 
create and use own media 
(Art. 9 (3.)) 
 
# respect for right to receive 
information in minority 
language (FRY Art. 46 (2.), 
Montenegro Art. 68); 
guarantee of public 
information in Hungarian, 
Slovak, Romanian and 
Ruthenian language in  AP 
Vojvodina (STATUTE OF THE 
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF 
VOJVODINA) 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
 
# prohibition of 
nformation inciting 
intolerance (Serbian LAW 
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
Art. 11); media used to 
strengthen Serbian national 
values (Serbian LAW ON 
RADIO-TELEVISION Art. 
19); programming in 
minority languages in AP 
Vojvodina and AP 
Kosovo-Metohija (Serbian 
LAW ON RADIO-TELEVISION 
Art. 20) 
 
# general control of media 
by means of Serbian LAW 
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
# virtually no 
programmes in Croat 
in public media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# several newspapers 
in minority languages, 
yet restrictions as part 
of general control of 
media 
 
R
e
lig
io
n 
# respect for right to 
freedom of religion of 
minorities (Art. 8) 
# respect for right to freedom 
of religion (FRY Art. 43) 
 
# promotion of right to 
religious identity of minorities 
through material support 
(Montenegro Art. 70) 
 
/ # official separation of 
Church and State; 
rapprochement of 
Serbian Orthodox 
Church and Serbian 
nationalist movement 
  
 
 
Interpreted against the historical background of social transformations in the former 
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Yugoslavia and within the context of the wider normative framework of international 
human rights law, this systematic analysis may be summarised as follows: 
  
(i) Constitutional provisions: Compared to the legal standards of the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, the constitutional provisions of the FRY and its 
constituent republics may be considered as more or less sufficient, with the 
exception that there is no prohibition of alteration of demographic composition 
and forced assimilation as stipulated in the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION (Art. 
16). Although the constitutions restrict some of the rights by making them 
conditional on the ordre public and legislative measures, they do not fall 
beyond the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, in which similar escape clauses are 
contained. The constitution of the Republic of Montenegro even guarantees 
more extensive rights to persons belonging to minorities, for instance by 
obliging the state to provide financial support for their educational and 
religious organisations (Art. 70). 
However, the constitutions of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia, adopted in 
the political atmosphere of new nationalism, cle rly limit the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities if compared to their legal position in the SFRJ. In 
particular, they curtail the territorial autonomy granted to the SAPs Vojvodina 
and Kosovo under the institutional framework of the SFRJ (see supra 
II.A.3.(a)). Although the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION does not address the issue 
of territorial autonomy, constitutional nationalism as displayed especially in 
these restrictions of former autonomy goes against the general trend in 
international law. 
 
(ii) Infrastructure and state policy:  The legislation through which the 
constitutional provisions are regulated in more detail appears more ambivalent 
in comparison with the standards of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION. Several 
legislative measures, including those which establish minority languages as 
official languages in administration and public proceedings in some regions 
(especially in the AP Vojvodina) or which implement the right to education in 
minority language, actually demonstrate a certain degree of pro-activ  
minority protection in the FRY.  
On the other hand, these legislative measures not only fall below the standards 
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of minority legislation in the SFRJ, thus creating a high potential for conflict, 
they also indicate that minority protection is absent from th  priority list of 
state policy, despite the urgency of such policies within the multi-ethnic and 
multi-confessional social space of the FRY. Even to the contrary, recent 
legislation openly restricts the participation of persons belonging to minorities 
in politics, education, culture and media. Some minorities, including the 
Croats, Muslims in the Sandžak and the Vlachs are not even recognised by the 
authorities, and others suffer from restrictive policy by state and local 
authorities. The most obvious example of this general pattern is, of course, the 
repressive state policy against Albanians in the AP Kosovo and Metohija in 
the 1990s (see supra II.A.3.(a) and II.B.1).  
 
(iii) Factual situation: Evaluated in the light of the standards of the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, the factual situation of minorities in the FRY is 
clearly inadequate and, in some cases, even alarming. It is unsatisfactory, since 
the implementation of those constitutional and legislative provisions on 
minority rights that do exist is affected by the aforementioned factors, most 
notably the lack of a firmly-anchored rule of law, the weakness of democratic 
institutions and of civil society (see supra I.A.3.); the cultural autonomy of 
many minorities is thereby drastically curtailed in the domais of language, 
education and media, most obviously in the Vojvodina, Sandžak and Kosovo 
regions. The factual situation is even alarming in those cases in which 
minorities rely on external states and thereby might become involved in the 
conflict-prone triadic relation of national minorities, nationalising states and 
national external homelands (see upra I.A.3.); the situation of Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo and Serbia, respectively, clearly has the potential to 
develop along these lines, if the interim administration of KFOR and UNMIK 
does not succeed in gaining legitimacy among the entire population in Kosovo, 
including the Serbs. Equally alarming is the situation of dispersed minorities, 
such as the Roma, who suffer from systematic exclusion from almost all are s 
of social life, most notably from the economic sector (see upra II.B.4.).
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IV. Conclusions 
By way of conclusion of the analysis of the situation of minorities in the FRY 
evaluated from the perspective of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, the remaining 
subsections of this paper highlight some priorities for a critical and constructive 
dialogue of the Council of Europe with the FRY on the protection of minorities. It 
should be noted that it is the Serbian-dom nated federal administration which is the 
critical partner for such a dialogue. As indicated above, the Republic of Montenegro, 
formally still part of the FRY, has adopted a strong Western political orientation, 
which has led to a latent, and unresolved, conflict between the two constituent 
republics. While this problem certainly merits reflection of its own, the following 
remarks focus on minority protection in Serbia as a major area of concern for the 
Council of Europe’s dialogue with the FRY. 
1. Implementing the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION  in the FRY 
In late 1999 and early 2000, within the context of international attempts at conflict 
resolution in South East Europe, the Council of Europe faced the question whether to 
invite the FRY to sign the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION or not. It was actually 
confronted with theFRY's explicit desire to sign the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, since 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the FRY already adopted a law ratifying the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION on 3 December 1998, which the FRY's government 
repeatedly highlighted as an expression of adherence to inter ational legal standards.97 
Since the FRY was not a member state of the Council of Europe and was not invited 
by the Committee of Ministers to accede to the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION before its 
entry into force on 1 February 1998, the FRY’s potential signature of the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION was legally regulated by its Art. 29 (1.). This article 
stipulates that, after the convention entered into force, the Committee of Ministers 
may invite non-member states to accession by a decision requiring a two-thirds
majority of the representatives casting a vote and a simple majority of the 
representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, according to Art. 20 (d.) of the 
STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. The question whether the FRY might accede to 
the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION under Art. 29(1.) was legally complicated by the fact 
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that the Explanatory Report specifies in para. 99 that "other States", to which Art. 
29(1.) may apply, are only those states that participate in the CSCE, from which the 
FRY was excluded until November 2000 (see upra II.A.1.).98 
 
Not unlike the OSCE in its decision regarding the status of the FRY,99 the Council of 
Europe theoretically had three active political options in this situation, with the 
passive option being the status quo. The first active option was an explicit refusal to 
invite the FRY to accede to the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION for a determined period of 
time. A second active option, contrary to the first one, was to offer either full 
membership or a special guest status in the Council of Europe which would 
automatically have included accession to the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION. It is clear 
that, given the FRY's non-adherence to the Council of Europe's basic principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights in the 1990s, this was, by that 
time, a mere theoretical option. A third active option, effectively a compromise 
between the other two, was to invite the FRY as a non-member state to accede to the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION under Art. 29(1.). In fact, this study has provided a 
number of arguments that would have justified this short- erm p litical option, 
especially, if regarded as a strategic element of a long-term p litical attempt at 
contributing to stability in South East Europe (see infra). 
 
After the democratic revolution in October 2000, however, the political situation 
changed entirely, with the FRY being readmitted to the UN and to the OSCE. In the 
wake of international recognition of the FRY’s new government, the Council of 
Europe offered the FRY the status of a Special Guest to the Parliamentary Assembly 
for the FRY (22 January 2001), with the consequence that the FRY signed the 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION on 11 May 2001. The FRY’s international obligations 
under the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION will enter into force on 1 September 2001. It 
should therefore be a major short-term priority of the Council of Europe to provide 
legal assistance to the FRY in helping to draft legislation on minority rights. In this 
process, the above analysis of the de jur and de facto situation of minorities in Serbia 
(see supra IV.B.) may help to single out sensitive issues at the level of constitutional 
                                                                                                                                            
97 See e.g. UN doc. CERD/C/364, para. 7. 
98 Explanatory Report, para. 99. 
99 For the debate within the OSCE, see Perry 1998, p. 51-54. 
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provisions, infrastructure and state policy, and factual treatment.  
2. Institutionalising democracy in a multi-ethn c context: a long-term perspective 
In order to contribute to an actual improvement of the situation of minorities, the 
implementation of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION should be situated in the long-term 
perspective of institutionalising democracy in Southeastern Europe. In fact, one of the 
major structural challenges faced by the post-communist societies in that region has 
been their transition to democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Given 
the complex multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the region's 
population, the improvement of minority-majority relations is an integral part of this 
transition process and requires the institutionalisation of a multi-layered sys em of 
membership in which each community may enjoy cultural autonomy while sharing a 
common political sphere. Any attempt at institutionalisation of the classical concept 
of the nation-state with its assumptions of a congruency between territorial 
sovereignty and national identity has, in turn, the potential of inducing inter-ethni  
conflict.100 Resulting from a combination of conditioning factors, most notably the 
institutional framework of the SFRJ with its intermingling of cultural autonomy of 
"nations" and territorial quasi-sovereignty of the republics, and triggering factors such 
as a changed geo-strategic environment and economic decline, the dissolution of the 
SFRJ was accompanied precisely by such an attempt at establishing new nation-states 
with the result of violent inter-ethnic conflict (see supra I.A.). In the Republic of 
Serbia, new nationalism permeated public discourse as well as the legal and political 
system and may be seen as a major factor of the deterioration of the de jure andde 
facto situation of minorities in the FRY (see supra II. and III.). 
 
In the long term, the resolution of inter-eth ic conflict and hence stabilisation of the 
southeastern European region will therefore require re-directing the post-communist 
transition process from new nationalism towards the path of  institutionalising a multi-
layered model of membership capable of providing a democratic framework for the 
peaceful coexistence of ethnic and confessional groups. Currently, such a form of 
                                                
100 The southeastern European region is therefore one of the primary examples for the causal nexus 
between structural features of the nation-state a d inter-ethnic conflict; see Stavenhagen, Rudolfo 1996, 
Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-S ate, London: UNRISD/Macmillan. 
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state organisation is envisioned in international law, particularly in those provisions 
which oblige states to respect, protect and promote the rights to non-discrimination, 
equality and cultural identity (see supra III.A.1.). The model of a multicultural 
democratic state based on the principle of personality (Personalitätsprinzip) n fact 
provides a major source of legitimacy for social movements which strive for more 
inclusive forms of political representation and participation, e.g. the Serbian dissident 
movement, minority organisations and international NGOs.101 Given that integration 
into the international legal and political mechanisms regularly c ates new 
opportunity structures for democratic forces, it should be a long-term priority of the 
Council of Europe to firmly include the FRY in its evolving system of minority 
protection.102 The ratification and implementation of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
may therefore be seen as an appropriate mid-term strategy in that direction. 
3. Including the FRY in the Stability Programme: a mid-ter  strategy 
One of the core elements of a mid-ter  strategy designed to achieve the 
aforementioned long-term goals is the implementation of the FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION in the FRY. The Council of Europe's contribution to the EU's Stability 
Pact, inaugurated at the Sarajevo Summit of 30 July 1999 and offering a perspective 
of membership in the EU to the countries in South East E rope, provides a basic 
starting-point for such a mid-term strategy. Thus, the Committee of Ministers' 
communication "Stability Programme for Southeast Europe" confirms as a long-term
goal "[...] to bring each and every country in Europe into accepting and living up to 
the principles of pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law which 
constitute the basis for membership of the Organisation".103 The FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION is explicitly mentioned as one of the instruments to be mobilised as a 
                                                
101 It should be noted that the Serbian opposition movement, in an address to the Western states, 
explicitly called for an end of international diplomatic isolation of the FRY and for cooperation of the 
OSCE and other international organisation with the FRY; see RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 4, No. 7, Part II 
(11 January 2000). 
102 With a similar argument, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, addressing the Kosovo 
crisis in 1996, invited the OSCE to allow the FRY to resume participation in its work so as to foster 
dialogue between the confli ting parties; see Parliamentary Assembly Resolution Re 1077 (1996), para 
6 (vi.). For a general analysis of the impact of international law on domestic political development in 
the area of human rights see Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), 1999, The 
Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations ; 66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
103 Council of Europe CM (99)79, I. 
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contribution to the stabilisation of the region.104 One may ask whether the exclusion of 
the FRY from the Stability Pact and Stability Programme before October 2000 was a 
wise political decision.105 In any event, the inclusion of the FRY in both programmes 
after the removal of the authoritarian regime has opened the way for a constructive 
political cooperation at the regional level. 
 
In fact, the implementation of the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION in the FRY will not 
immediately improve the situation of minorities without the adoption of 
accompanying several measures aimed at tempering new nationalism in Serbia. Since 
economic decline is one of the major factors contributing to the success of nationalist 
politics (see supra I.A.3), an economic component of the Stability Programme is quite 
crucial; this is particularly relevant for an improvement of the situation of the Roma in 
the FRY (see supra II.B.4.). Moreover, any improvement of the situation of minorities 
will require concerted efforts at solving the refugee problem in Se bia, by which the 
ethnic composition in Vojvodina and in the Sandžak is particularly affected. These 
efforts would need to include regional cooperation between the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia, with a view to arriving at a consensus on citizenship regulations 
and on the recognition of new national minorities.106 A further priority in a coherent 
mid-term strategy is to strengthen the local administration, so as to counter the 
measures of centralisation adopted by the Serbian government in the 1990s; inter-
ethnic relations in mixed communities would certainly improve, if democratic organs 
at the local level were granted a higher degree of autonomy. The Congress of Local 
and Regional Authorities of Europe of the Council of Europe could assist in the 
creation of local conditions for implementing legal standards of minority protection. 
 
It can be concluded that, if situated within an integrated mid-term strategy for stability 
in South East Europe, the implementation of FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES in the FRY could be a major political step in 
achieving the long-term goal of institutionalising democracy in the multi-ethnic and 
                                                
104 Council of Europe CM (99)79, II. and III. (2.). 
105 Isolation has actually perpetuated the power of the ruling regime in Belgrade; see for a similar 
argument Steil, Benn and Susan L. Woodward 1999, "A European 'New Deal' for the Balkans" in: 
Foreign Affairs 78(6): pp. 95-105, here p. 103f. 
106 This point is highlighted by UN Special Rapporteur Jiri Dienstbier in one of his recent report; see 
UN doc. A/54/396/Add. 1, para. 118.
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multi-confessional social space of the Balkans. 
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Appendix: Political parties in the FRY  
Table 1 
 
Election results (number of seats) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
November 1996 October 2000 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 
Yugoslav Left (JUL) 
New Democracy (ND)  
64 44 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 16 5 
Serbian People’s Party (SNS) - 2 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)* - 58 
ZAJEDNO 22 - 
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians  3 1 
Vojvodina Coalition 2 - 
Coalition "List of Sandžak", S. Uglijanin, D Sc. 1 - 
Socialist People’s Party (SNP) of Montenegro 8 28 
DPS of Montenegro 20 -** 
SDP Montenegro 1 -** 
DAP of Montenegro 1 -** 
Total number of seats 138 138 
 
* Coalition comprised of: see Table 2. 
** No participation in October 2000 federal elections. 
 
Table 2  
 
Election results (number of seats) Republic of Serbia 
September 1997 December 2000 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 
Yugoslav Left (JUL)  
New Democracy (ND)  
110 37 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 82 23 
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) 45 - 
Party of Serbian Unity - 14 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)* - 176 
Coalition "Vojvodina" 4 - 
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 4 - 
Coalition "List of Sandžak", S. Uglijanin, D Sc. 3 - 
Democratic Coalition Presevo - Bujanovac 1 - 
Democratic Alternative 1 - 
Total number of seats 250 250 
 
* Coalition comprised of: Democratic Party of Serbia, Democratic Alternative, Democratic 
Party, New Democracy (ND), Movement for Democratic Serbia, Alliance of Vojvodina 
Hungarians, League of Vojvodina Social-Democrats, Civil Alliance of Serbia, Social-
Democracy, Christian Democratic Party of Serbia, Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina, 
Association of Free and Independent Trade Unions, New Serbia, League for Sumadija, 
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Democratic Centre, Social-Democratic Union, Coalition Vojvodina, Sa džak Democratic 
Party. 
 
 
Table 3  
 
Republic of Montenegro Election results of May 1998 
(number of seats) 
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)
People's Party (NP) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP)   
42 
Socialist People's Party (SNP) 29 
Liberal Alliance inMontenegro (LSCG) 5 
Democratic Alliance in Montenegro (DSCG) 1 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)  1 
Total number of seats 78 
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Abbreviations 
AP   Autonomous Province 
CERD   Commission for the Elimination of Racial Equality 
CSCE   Conference for Security and Co- peration in Europe 
DOS   Demokratska Opozicijy Srbije (Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia) 
DSHV Demokratiska savez Hrvatska vojvodjanskih (Democratic 
Alliance of Croats in the Vojvodina) 
DZVM Demokratska zajednica vojvodjanskih Madjara (Democratic 
Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina) 
EC   European Community 
ECHR EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND BASIC FREEDOMS 
EU   European Union 
FRY   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
ICCPR  INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS  
IMF   International Monetary Fund
JNA   Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People's Army) 
JUL    Jugoslovenska levica (Yugoslav Left) 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
LDK   Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo)
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation 
OSCE   Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
RFE/RL  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
SAP   Socialist Autonomous Province 
SDS   Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party) 
SFRJ Socijalistièka Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) 
SKJ Savez Komunista Jugoslavije (League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia) 
SPO Serbian Renewal Movement 
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SPS   Socijalistièka Partija Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia) 
SRS   Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party) 
UN   United Nations 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNTS   United Nations Treaty Series 
US   United States  
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